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Abstract
This paper considers the appropriate stabilization objectives for monetary
policy in a microfounded model with staggered price-setting. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2002) have shown that under certain con-
ditions, a local approximation to the expected utility of the representative
household in a model of this kind is related inversely to the expected dis-
counted value of a conventional quadratic loss function, in which each period’s
loss is a weighted average of squared deviations of inflation and an output gap
measure from their optimal values (zero). However, those derivations rely on
an assumption of the existence of an output or employment subsidy that off-
sets the distortion due to the market power of monopolistically-competitive
price-setters, so that the steady state under a zero-inflation policy involves an
efficient level of output. Here we show how to dispense with this unappealing
assumption, so that a valid linear-quadratic approximation to the optimal pol-
icy problem is possible even when the steady state is distorted to an arbitrary
extent (allowing for tax distortions as well as market power), and when, as a
consequence, it is necessary to take account of the effects of stabilization policy
on the average level of output.
We again obtain a welfare-theoretic loss function that involves both inflation
and an appropriately defined output gap, though the degree of distortion of the
steady state affects both the weights on the two stabilization objectives and
the definition of the welfare-relevant output gap. In the light of these results,
we reconsider the conditions under which complete price stability is optimal,
and find that they are more restrictive in the case of a distorted steady state.
We also consider the conditions under which pure randomization of monetary
policy can be welfare-improving, and find that this is possible in the case of
a sufficiently distorted steady state, though the parameter values required are
probably not empirically realistic.
∗We would like to thank Jordi Gali, Bob King, Andrew Scott, and Alex Wolman for comments,
and the National Science Foundation for research support through a grant to the NBER.
According to a common conception of the goals of monetary stabilization policy,
it is appropriate for the monetary authority to aim to stabilize both some measure
of inflation and some measure of real activity relative to potential. This is often
represented by supposing that the authority should seek to minimize the expected
discounted value of a quadratic loss function, in which each period’s loss consists of
a weighted average of the square of the inflation rate and the square of the “output
gap.” It is furthermore typically argued that the two stabilization goals are not fully
compatible with one another, owing to the occurrence of “cost-push shocks,” which
prevent a zero output gap from being consistent with zero inflation. The problem of
finding an optimal tradeoff between the two goals is then non-trivial.1
This familiar framework raises a number of questions, however. Most obvious is
the question of how to define the “output gap” that policy should seek to stabilize.
Should this be understood to mean output relative to some smooth trend, or should
the target output level vary in response to real disturbances of various sorts? A
closely related question is the definition of the “cost-push shocks”: how should these
be identified in practice, and how often do disturbances of this kind actually occur?
And even supposing that we know how to identify the output gap and the cost-push
disturbances, what relative weight should be placed on output-gap stabilization as
opposed to inflation stabilization?
Here we propose to answer such questions on welfare-theoretic grounds. The
ultimate aim of monetary policy, in our view, should be the maximization of the
expected utility of households. We show, however (following a method introduced by
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, and further expounded in Woodford, 2002; 2003,
chap. 6), that it is possible to derive a quadratic approximation to the expected
utility of the representative household that takes the form of a discounted quadratic
loss function of the kind assumed in the traditional literature on monetary policy
evaluation. In the case that the exogenous disturbances are sufficiently small in
amplitude, the best policy (in terms of expected utility) will also be the one that
minimizes the discounted quadratic loss function. We thus obtain precise answers to
the question of what terms should appear in a quadratic loss function, and with which
relative weights, that depend on the specification of one’s model of the monetary
transmission mechanism.2
1See, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999) and Walsh (2003, chaps. 8, 11) for a number of analyses in this
vein.
2For examples of the way in which alternative model specifications lead to alternative welfare-
theoretic loss functions, see Woodford (2003, chap. 6) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
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An important limitation of the method introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) is that it requires that the zero-inflation steady state of one’s model involve an
efficient level of output.3 (They imagine a model in which this is true by assuming the
existence of an output subsidy that offsets the distortion resulting from the market
power of monopolistically competitive suppliers, though this is obviously not liter-
ally true in actual economies.) For if one were instead to consider the more realistic
case of an economy in which steady-state output is inefficiently low, one would find
that expected utility would depend on the expected level of output. An estimate of
expected utility that is accurate to second order would then require a solution for
output (or at any rate, for the expected discounted level of output) that is accurate
to second order in the amplitude of the exogenous disturbances. A log-linear approx-
imation to the structural equations of one’s model will then not suffice to allow one to
determine the evolution of output under one policy or another to a sufficient degree
of accuracy. As a consequence, a linear-quadratic methodology — in which a linear
policy rule is derived so as to minimize a quadratic approximation to the true welfare
objective subject to linear constraints that are first-order approximations to the true
structural equations — will not generally yield a correct linear approximation to the
optimal policy rule.4
Here we show how the method of Rotemberg and Woodford can be extended
to deal with the case in which the steady-state level of output is inefficient (owing
to the existence of distorting taxes on sales revenues or labor income, in addition
to the distortions created by market power). Our approach involves computation
of a second-order approximation to the model structural relations (specifically, to
the aggregate-supply relation in the present application), and using this to solve for
the expected discounted value of output as a function of purely quadratic terms.
This solution can then be used to substitute for the terms proportional to expected
discounted output in the quadratic approximation to expected utility. In this way,
we obtain an approximation to expected utility — that holds regardless of the policy
contemplated (as long as it involves inflation that is not too extreme) — and that is
3Strictly speaking, it is not essential to the method that zero be the inflation rate that leads to
the efficient level of output; it is only necessary that there be some such steady state, and that the
policies that one intends to compare all be close enough to being consistent with that steady state.
4See Woodford (2003, chap. 6) and Benigno andWoodford (2004c) for discussion of the conditions
required for validity of an LQ approach.
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purely quadratic, in the sense of lacking any linear terms. This alternative quadratic
loss function can then be evaluated to second order using an approximate solution
for the endogenous variables of one’s model that is accurate only to first order. One
is then able to compute a linear approximation to optimal policy using a simple
linear-quadratic methodology.
Our proposal to substitute purely quadratic terms for the discounted linear terms
in the Taylor approximation to expected utility builds upon an idea of Sutherland
(2002), who showed how it was possible to take account of the effects of macroeco-
nomic volatility on the average levels of variables in welfare calculations for a model
with Calvo pricing like the baseline model considered here. Sutherland’s crucial in-
sight was that it is not necessary to compute a complete second-order solution for
the evolution of the endogenous variables under each of the policies that one wishes
to consider in order to evaluate the discounted linear terms needed for the welfare
calculation. Sutherland’s approach, however, still requires that one restrict attention
to a particular parametric family of policy rules before computing the second-order
approximations that are used to substitute for the discounted linear terms in the
welfare criterion. Instead, we show that one can substitute out the linear terms using
only a second-order approximation to the structural equations; one thus obtains a
welfare criterion that applies to arbitrary policies.5
An alternative way of attaining a welfare measure that is accurate to second or-
der even in the case of a distorted steady state, that has recently become popular, is
to solve for a second-order approximation to the complete evolution of the endoge-
nous variables under any given policy rule, and then use this solution to evaluate a
quadratic approximation to expected utility (e.g., Kim et al., 2002). However, the
requirement that a system of quadratic expectational difference equations be solved
for each policy rule that is contemplated is much more computationally demanding
than the implementation of our LQ methodology. For we are required to consider the
second-order approximation to our structural equations only once — when deriving
the appropriate quadratic loss function, a calculation undertaken in this paper —
after which the evaluation of individual policies requires only that one solve a system
of linear equations. In addition, the method illustrated by Kim et al. requires that
5It might seem fortuitous that we are able to do this in the present case, but Benigno and
Woodford (2004c) shows that substitutions of this kind can be used quite generally to obtain a
purely quadratic loss function.
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one restrict one’s attention to a particular parametric family of policy rules, since
the system of equations that is solved to second order must include a specification of
the policy rule. Our method, by contrast, allows us to determine what variables it is
desirable for policy to depend on without having to prejudge that issue.
Yet another approach that allows a correct calculation of a linear approximation
to the optimal policy rule even in the case of a distorted steady state is to compute
first-order conditions that characterize optimal policy in the exact model (i.e., with-
out approximating either the welfare measure or the structural equations), and then
log-linearize these optimality conditions in order to obtain an approximate charac-
terization of optimal policy (e.g., King and Wolman, 1999; Khan et al., 2003). A
disadvantage of this approach is that it is only suitable for computing the optimal
policy; our quadratic approximate welfare measure also yields a correct ranking of
alternative sub-optimal policy rules, as long as disturbances are small enough, and
the policies under comparison all involve low inflation. Furthermore, our LQ ap-
proach makes it straightforward to consider whether the second-order conditions for
a policy to be a local optimum are satisfied, and not just the first-order conditions
that are typically considered in the literature on “Ramsey policy”, as we show in
section 3.1 below. Under conditions where the second-order conditions are satisfied,
our approach and the one used by Khan et al. yield identical approximate linear char-
acterizations of optimal policy; but we believe that the LQ approach provides useful
insight into the aspects of the policy problem that are responsible for the conclusions
obtained. We illustrate this in sections 3.2 and 3.3 by providing an analytical deriva-
tion of results with the same qualitative features as the numerical results reported by
Khan et al. for a related model.
1 Monetary Stabilization Policy: Welfare-Theoretic
Foundations
Here we describe our assumptions about the economic environment and pose the
optimization problem that a monetary stabilization policy is intended to solve. The
approximation method that we use to characterize the solution to this problem is then
presented in the following section. Further details of the derivation of the structural
equations of our model of nominal price rigidity can be found in Woodford (2003,
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chapter 3).
1.1 Objective and Constraints
The goal of policy is assumed to be the maximization of the level of expected utility
of a representative household. In our model, each household seeks to maximize
Ut0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
u˜(Ct; ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v˜(Ht(j); ξt)dj
]
, (1.1)
where Ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of each of a continuum of
differentiated goods,
Ct ≡
[∫ 1
0
ct(i)
θ
θ−1di
] θ−1
θ
, (1.2)
with an elasticity of substitution equal to θ > 1, and Ht(j) is the quantity supplied
of labor of type j. Each differentiated good is supplied by a single monopolistically
competitive producer. There are assumed to be many goods in each of an infinite
number of “industries”; the goods in each industry j are produced using a type of
labor that is specific to that industry, and suppliers in the same industry also change
their prices at the same time. The representative household supplies all types of labor
as well as consuming all types of goods.6 To simplify the algebraic form of our results,
in our main exposition we shall restrict attention to the case of isoelastic functional
forms,
u˜(Ct; ξt) ≡
C1−σ˜
−1
t C¯
σ˜−1
t
1− σ˜−1 , (1.3)
v˜(Ht; ξt) ≡
λ
1 + ν
H1+νt H¯
−ν
t , (1.4)
where σ˜, ν > 0, and {C¯t, H¯t} are bounded exogenous disturbance processes. (We use
the notation ξt to refer to the complete vector of exogenous disturbances, including
C¯t and H¯t.)
7
6We might alternatively assume specialization across households in the type of labor supplied; in
the presence of perfect sharing of labor income risk across households, household decisions regarding
consumption and labor supply would all be as assumed here.
7The extension of our results to the case of more general preferences is taken up in a longer
version of this paper (Benigno and Woodford, 2004a).
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We assume a common technology for the production of all goods, in which (industry-
specific) labor is the only variable input,
yt(i) = Atf(ht(i)) = Atht(i)
1/φ,
where At is an exogenously varying technology factor, and φ > 1.
8 Inverting the
production function to write the demand for each type of labor as a function of the
quantities produced of the various differentiated goods, and using the identity
Yt = Ct +Gt
to substitute for Ct, where Gt is exogenous government demand for the composite
good, we can write the utility of the representative household as a function of the
expected production plan {yt(i)}.9
The utility of the representative household (our welfare measure) can be expressed
as a function of equilibrium production,
Ut0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
u(Yt; ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v(yjt ; ξt)dj
]
, (1.5)
where
u(Yt; ξt) ≡ u˜(Yt −Gt; ξt),
v(yjt ; ξt) ≡ v˜(f−1(yjt/At); ξt).
In this last expression we make use of the fact that the quantity produced of each
good in industry j will be the same, and hence can be denoted yjt ; and that the
quantity of labor hired by each of these firms will also be the same, so that the total
demand for labor of type j is proportional to the demand of any one of these firms.
We can furthermore express the relative quantities demanded of the differentiated
goods each period as a function of their relative prices. This allows us to write the
utility flow to the representative household in the form U(Yt,∆t; ξt), where
∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ(1+ω)
di ≥ 1 (1.6)
8Again, more general production functions are considered in Benigno and Woodford (2004a).
9The government is assumed to need to obtain an exogenously given quantity of the Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate each period, and to obtain this in a cost-minimizing fashion. Hence the government
allocates its purchases across the suppliers of differentiated goods in the same proportion as do
households, and the index of aggregate demand Yt is the same function of the individual quantities
{yt(i)} as Ct is of the individual quantities consumed {ct(i)}, defined in (1.2).
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is a measure of price dispersion at date t, in which Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
, (1.7)
and the vector ξt now includes the exogenous disturbances Gt and At as well as the
preference shocks. Hence we can write our objective (1.5) as
Ut0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(Yt,∆t; ξt). (1.8)
The producers in each industry fix the prices of their goods in monetary units for
a random interval of time, as in the model of staggered pricing introduced by Calvo
(1983). We let 0 ≤ α < 1 be the fraction of prices that remain unchanged in any
period. A supplier that changes its price in period t chooses its new price pt(i) to
maximize
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
αT−tQt,TΠ(pt(i), p
j
T , PT ;YT , ξT )
}
, (1.9)
where Qt,T is the stochastic discount factor by which financial markets discount ran-
dom nominal income in period T to determine the nominal value of a claim to such
income in period t, and αT−t is the probability that a price chosen in period t will
not have been revised by period T . In equilibrium, this discount factor is given by
Qt,T = β
T−t u˜c(CT ; ξT )
u˜c(Ct; ξt)
Pt
PT
. (1.10)
The function
Π(p, pj, P ;Y, ξ) ≡ (1−τ)pY (p/P )−θ−µw v˜h(f
−1(Y (pj/P )−θ/A); ξ)
u˜c(Y −G; ξ) P ·f
−1(Y (p/P )−θ/A)
(1.11)
indicates the after-tax nominal profits of a supplier with price p, in an industry
with common price pj, when the aggregate price index is equal to P and aggregate
demand is equal to Y . Here τ t is the proportional tax on sales revenues in period t;
we treat {τ t} as an exogenous disturbance process, taken as given by the monetary
policymaker.10 We assume that τ t fluctuates over a small interval around a non-
zero steady-state level τ¯ ; this is another of the possible reasons for inefficiency of the
10The extension to the case in which the tax rate is also chosen optimally in response to other
shocks is treated in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
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steady-state level of output that we consider.11 Profits are equal to after-tax sales
revenues net of the wage bill, and the real wage demanded for labor of type j is
assumed to be given by
wt(j) = µ
w
t
v˜h(Ht(j); ξ)
u˜c(Ct; ξt)
, (1.12)
where µwt ≥ 1 is an exogenous markup factor in the labor market (allowed to vary
over time, but assumed common to all labor markets),12 and firms are assumed to
be wage-takers. We allow for exogenous variations in both the tax rate and the wage
markup in order to include the possibility of “pure cost-push shocks” that affect
equilibrium pricing behavior while implying no change in the efficient allocation of
resources.13 The disturbances τ t and µ
w
t are also included as elements of the vector
ξt.
Each of the suppliers that revise their prices in period t choose the same new price
p∗t , that maximizes (1.9). Note that supplier i’s profits are a concave function of the
quantity sold yt(i), since revenues are proportional to y
θ−1
θ
t (i) and hence concave in
yt(i), while costs are convex in yt(i). Moreover, since yt(i) is proportional to pt(i)
−θ,
the profit function is also concave in pt(i)
−θ. The first-order condition for the optimal
choice of the price pt(i) is the same as the one with respect to pt(i)
−θ; hence the first-
order condition with respect to pt(i),
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
αT−tQt,TΠ1(pt(i), p
j
T , PT ;YT , ξT )
}
= 0,
is both necessary and sufficient for an optimum. The equilibrium choice p∗t (which
is the same for each firm in industry j) is the solution to the equation obtained by
substituting pt(i) = p
j
t = p
∗
t into the above.
Under our assumed isoelastic functional forms, the optimal choice has a closed-
11Other types of distorting taxes would have similar consequences, since it is the overall size of
the steady-state inefficiency wedge that is of greatest importance for our analysis, as we show below.
To economize on notation, we assume that the only distorting tax is of this particular kind.
12In the case that we assume that µwt = 1 at all times, our model is one in which both households
and firms are wage-takers, or there is efficient contracting between them.
13We show below, however, that these two disturbances are not, in general, the only reasons for
the existence of a “cost-push” term in our aggregate-supply relation, in the sense of a term that
creates a tension between the goals of inflation stabilization and output-gap stabilization.
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form solution
p∗t
Pt
=
(
Kt
Ft
) 1
1+ωθ
, (1.13)
where ω ≡ φ(1 + ν)− 1 > 0 is the elasticity of real marginal cost in an industry with
respect to industry output, and Ft and Kt are functions of current aggregate output
Yt, the current exogenous state ξt, and the expected future evolution of inflation,
output, and disturbances, defined by
Ft ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t(1− τT )f(YT ; ξT )
(
PT
Pt
)θ−1
, (1.14)
Kt ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−tk(YT ; ξT )
(
PT
Pt
)θ(1+ω)
, (1.15)
in which expressions
f(Y ; ξ) ≡ uy(Y ; ξ)Y, (1.16)
k(Y ; ξ) ≡ θ
θ − 1µ
wvy(Y ; ξ)Y. (1.17)
The price index then evolves according to a law of motion
Pt =
[
(1− α)p∗1−θt + αP 1−θt−1
] 1
1−θ , (1.18)
as a consequence of (1.7). Substitution of (1.13) into (1.18) implies that equilibrium
inflation in any period is given by
1− αΠθ−1t
1− α =
(
Ft
Kt
) θ−1
1+ωθ
, (1.19)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1. This defines a short-run aggregate supply relation between
inflation and output, given the current disturbances ξt, and expectations regarding
future inflation, output, and disturbances. This is the only relevant constraint on the
monetary authority’s ability to simultaneously stabilize inflation and output in our
model.
Because the relative prices of the industries that do not change their prices in
period t remain the same, we can also use (1.18) to derive a law of motion of the form
∆t = h(∆t−1,Πt) (1.20)
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for the dispersion measure defined in (1.6), where
h(∆,Π) ≡ α∆Πθ(1+ω) + (1− α)
(
1− αΠθ−1
1− α
)− θ(1+ω)
1−θ
.
This is the source in our model of welfare losses from inflation or deflation.
We assume the existence of a lump-sum source of government revenue (in addition
to the fixed tax rate τ), and assume that the fiscal authority ensures intertemporal
government solvency regardless of what monetary policy may be chosen by the mone-
tary authority.14 This allows us to abstract from the fiscal consequences of alternative
monetary policies in our consideration of optimal monetary stabilization policy, as is
common in the literature on monetary policy rules. An extension of our analysis to
the case in which only distorting taxes exist is presented in Benigno and Woodford
(2003).
Finally, we abstract here from any monetary frictions that would account for
a demand for central-bank liabilities that earn a substandard rate of return; we
nonetheless assume that the central bank can control the riskless short-term nominal
interest rate it,
15 which is in turn related to other financial asset prices through the
arbitrage relation
1 + it = [EtQt,t+1]
−1.
We shall assume that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates never binds
under the optimal policies considered below,16 so that we need not introduce any
additional constraint on the possible paths of output and prices associated with a
need for the chosen evolution of prices to be consistent with a non-negative nomi-
nal interest rate. We also note that the ability of the central bank to control it in
each period gives it one degree of freedom each period (in each possible state of the
world) with which to determine equilibrium outcomes. Because of the existence of
the aggregate-supply relation (1.19) as a necessary constraint on the joint evolution
14Thus we here assume that fiscal policy is “Ricardian,” in the terminology of Woodford (2001).
A non-Ricardian fiscal policy would imply the existence of an additional constraint on the set of
equilibria that could be achieved through monetary policy. The consequences of such a constraint
for the character of optimal monetary policy will be considered elsewhere.
15For discussion of how this is possible even in a “cashless” economy of the kind assumed here,
see Woodford (2003, chapter 2).
16This can be shown to be true in the case of small enough disturbances, given that the nominal
interest rate is equal to r¯ = β−1 − 1 > 0 under the optimal policy in the absence of disturbances.
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of inflation and output, there is exactly one degree of freedom to be determined each
period, in order to determine particular stochastic processes {Πt, Yt} from among
the set of possible rational-expectations equilibria.17 Hence we shall suppose that
the monetary authority can choose from among the possible processes {Πt, Yt} that
constitute rational-expectations equilibria, and consider which equilibrium it is opti-
mal to bring about; the detail that policy is implemented through the control of a
short-term nominal interest rate will not actually matter to our calculations.
1.2 Optimal Policy from a “Timeless Perspective”
Under the standard (Ramsey) approach to the characterization of an optimal policy
commitment, one chooses among state-contingent paths {Πt, Yt,∆t} from some initial
date t0 onward that satisfy (1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0,18 given initial price dis-
persion ∆t0−1, so as to maximize (1.8). Such a t0−optimal plan requires commitment,
insofar as the corresponding t−optimal plan for some later date t, given the condi-
tion ∆t−1 obtaining at that date, will not involve a continuation of the t0−optimal
plan. This failure of time consistency occurs because the constraints on what can be
achieved at date t0, consistent with the existence of a rational-expectations equilib-
rium, depend on the expected paths of inflation and output at later dates; but in the
absence of a prior commitment, a planner would have no motive at those later dates
to choose a policy consistent with the anticipations that it was desirable to create at
date t0.
However, the degree of advance commitment that is necessary to bring about an
optimal equilibrium is of only a limited sort. Let xt ≡ (Πt, Yt,∆t), Xt ≡ (Ft, Kt), and
let F(ξt) be the set of values for (∆t−1, Xt) such that there exist paths {xT} for dates
T ≥ t that satisfy (1.19) and (1.20) for each T , that are consistent with the specified
values for the elements of Xt, and that imply a well-defined value for the objective
Ut defined in (1.8).
19 Furthermore, for any (∆t−1, Xt) ∈ F(ξt), let V (∆t−1, Xt; ξt)
17At least, this is the case if one restricts attention to those equilibrium in which inflation and
output remain forever within certain neighborhoods of the steady-state values defined below. We
are here concerned solely with the choice of an optimal policy from among those policies consistent
with a nearby equilibrium of this kind, as this is the problem to which our approximation technique
may be applied.
18Here the definitions (1.14) – (1.15) are understood to have been substituted for Ft and Kt in
equation (1.19).
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denote the maximum attainable value of Ut among the state-contingent paths that
satisfy the constraints just mentioned. Then the t0−optimal plan can be obtained as
the solution to the following two-stage optimization problem.
In the first stage, values of the endogenous variables xt0 and state-contingent
commitments Xt0+1(ξt0+1) for the following period, are chosen so as to maximize an
objective defined below. Then in the second stage, the equilibrium evolution from
period t0+1 onward is chosen to solve the maximization problem that defines the value
function V (∆t0 , Xt0+1; ξt0+1), given the state of the world ξt0+1 and the precommitted
values for Xt0+1 associated with that state.
In defining the objective for the first stage of this equivalent formulation of the
Ramsey problem, it is useful to let Π(F,K) denote the value of Πt that solves (1.19)
for given values of Ft and Kt. We also define the functional relationships
Jˆ [xt, Xt+1(·)](ξt) ≡ U(Yt,∆t; ξt) + βEtV (∆t, Xt+1; ξt+1),
Fˆ [xt, Xt+1(·)](ξt) ≡ (1− τ t)f(Yt; ξt) + αβEt{Π(Ft+1, Kt+1)θ−1Ft+1},
Kˆ[xt, Xt+1(·)](ξt) ≡ k(Yt; ξt) + αβEt{Π(Ft+1, Kt+1)θ(1+ω)Kt+1},
where f(Y ; ξ) and k(Y ; ξ) are defined in (1.16) and (1.17).
Then in the first stage, xt0 andXt0+1(·) are chosen so as to maximize Jˆ [xt0 , Xt0+1(·)](ξt0)
over values of xt0 and Xt0+1(·) such that
(i) Πt0 and ∆t0 satisfy (1.20);
(ii) the values
Ft0 = Fˆ [xt0 , Xt0+1(·)](ξt0), (1.21)
Kt0 = Kˆ[xt0 , Xt0+1(·)](ξt0) (1.22)
satisfy
Πt0 = Π(Ft0 , Kt0); (1.23)
and
(iii) the choices (∆t0 , Xt0+1) ∈ F for each possible state of the world ξt0+1.
19In the notation F(ξt), ξt refers to the state of the world at date t, i.e., to a complete specification
of all information that is available at that date about both the current exogenous disturbances
and the joint probability distribution of all future disturbances. Under the assumption that the
state vector ξt is Markovian, we can use the same notation ξt for a summary of all exogenous
disturbances in period t and the state of the world in period t. The argument ξt of the value
function V (∆t−1, Xt; ξt) has the same interpretation.
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The following result can then be established, as shown in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Given ∆t0−1, let the process {xt} be determined by (i) choosing
xt0 and state-contingent commitments Xt0+1(ξt0+1) to solve the first-stage problem
just stated, and (ii) for each possible state of the world ξt0+1, choosing the evolution
of xt for t ≥ t0 + 1 so as to maximize Ut0+1, among all of the paths consistent with
(1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0 + 1, given ∆t0 , and that are also consistent with the
value of Xt0+1(ξt0+1) determined in the first stage. Then the process {xt} represents
a Ramsey policy; that is, it maximizes Ut0 among all of the paths consistent with
(1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0, given ∆t0−1.
The optimization problem in stage two of this reformulation of the Ramsey prob-
lem is of the same form as the Ramsey problem itself, except that there are additional
constraints associated with the precommitted values for the elements of Xt0+1(ξt0+1).
Let us consider a problem like the Ramsey problem just defined, looking forward from
some period t0, except under the constraints that the quantities Xt0 must take certain
given values, where (∆t0−1, Xt0) ∈ F(ξt0). This constrained problem can similarly be
expressed as a two-stage problem of the same form as above, with an identical stage
two problem to the one described above. Stage two of this constrained problem is
thus of exactly the same form as the problem itself. Hence the constrained problem
has a recursive form, even though the original Ramsey problem did not. This is
shown by the following proposition, also proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Given some (∆t0−1, Xt0) ∈ F(ξt0), consider the sequential de-
cision problem in which in each period t ≥ t0, (xt, Xt+1(·)) are chosen to maximize
Jˆ [xt, Xt+1(·)](ξt), subject to constraints (i) – (iii) of the “first stage” problem stated
above, given the predetermined state variable ∆t−1 and the precommitted values Xt.
Then the process {xt} that is chosen in this way is the process that maximizes Ut0
among all of the paths consistent with (1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0, given ∆t0−1,
and also consistent with the specified values Xt0 .
Our aim here is to characterize policy that solves the constrained optimization
problem with which Proposition 2 is concerned i.e., policy that is optimal from some
date t onward given precommitted values for Xt. Because of the recursive form of this
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problem, it is possible for a commitment to a time-invariant policy rule from date t
onward to implement an equilibrium that solves the problem, for some specification
of the initial commitments Xt. A time-invariant policy rule with this property is said
by Woodford (2003, chapter 7) to be “optimal from a timeless perspective.”20 Such
a rule is one that a policymaker that solves a traditional Ramsey problem would be
willing to commit to eventually follow, though the solution to the Ramsey problem
involves different behavior initially, as there is no need to internalize the effects of
prior anticipation of the policy adopted for period t0.
21 One might also argue that it
is desirable to commit to follow such a rule immediately, even though such a policy
would not solve the (unconstrained) Ramsey problem, as a way of demonstrating
one’s willingness to accept constraints that one wishes the public to believe that one
will accept in the future.
2 A Linear-Quadratic Approximate Problem
In fact, we shall here characterize the solution to this problem (and similarly, derive
optimal time-invariant policy rules) only for initial conditions near certain steady-
state values, allowing us to use local approximations in characterizing optimal pol-
icy.22 We establish that these steady-state values have the property that if one starts
from initial conditions close enough to the steady state, and exogenous disturbances
thereafter are small enough, the optimal policy subject to the initial commitments
remains forever near the steady state. Hence our local characterization describes the
long run character of Ramsey policy, in the event that disturbances are small enough.
Of greater interest here, it describes policy that is optimal from a timeless perspective
20See also Woodford (1999) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
21In the present model, Ramsey policy involves an initial positive rate of inflation, even in the
absence of any shocks, even though in the long run it involves a commitment to maintain a zero
inflation rate on average. This is because welfare is increased by exploiting the Phillips curve to
increase output through an inflationary policy initially; but it is not optimal to create the anticipation
that one will behave in this way later, owing to the adverse effects of the anticipated inflation on
earlier periods’ inflation/output tradeoffs. See Woodford (2003, chapter 7) for further discussion.
22Local approximations of the same sort are often used in the literature in numerical character-
izations of Ramsey policy. Strictly speaking, however, such approximations are valid only in the
case of initial commitments Xt0 near enough to the steady-state values of these variables, and the
t0− optimal (Ramsey) policy need not involve values of Xt0 near the steady-state values, even in
the absence of random disturbances.
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in the event of small disturbances.
We first must show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal policy (under
appropriate initial conditions) that involves constant values of all variables. To this
end we consider the purely deterministic case, in which the exogenous disturbances
C¯t,Gt,H¯t,At,µ
w
t ,τ t each take constant values C¯, H¯, A¯, µ¯
w, τ¯ > 0, G¯ ≥ 0 for all t ≥ t0.
We wish to find an initial degree of price dispersion ∆t0−1 and initial commitments
Xt0 = X¯ such that the solution to the problem defined in Proposition 2 involves a
constant policy xt = x¯, Xt+1 = X¯ each period, in which ∆¯ is equal to the initial
price dispersion. We show in Appendix B that the first-order conditions for this
problem admit a steady-state solution of this form, and we verify below that (when our
parameters satisfy certain bounds) the second-order conditions for a local optimum
are also satisfied.
We show that Π¯ = 1(zero inflation), and correspondingly that ∆¯ = 1(zero price
dispersion).23 We may furthermore assume without loss of generality that the con-
stant values of C¯ and H¯ are chosen so that in the optimal steady state, Ct = C¯ and
Ht = H¯ each period.
24
We next wish to characterize the optimal responses to small perturbations of the
initial conditions and small fluctuations in the disturbance processes around the above
values. To do this, we compute a linear-quadratic approximate problem, the solution
to which represents a linear approximation to the solution to the policy problem
defined in Proposition 2. An important advantage of this approach is that it allows
direct comparison of our results with those obtained in other analyses of optimal
monetary stabilization policy. Other advantages are that it makes it straightforward
to verify whether the second-order conditions hold that are required in order for
a solution to our first-order conditions to be at least a local optimum (see section
3.1), and that it provides us with a welfare measure with which to rank alternative
sub-optimal policies, in addition to allowing computation of the optimal policy.
We begin by computing a Taylor-series approximation to our welfare measure
(1.8), expanding around the steady-state allocation defined above, in which yt(i) = Y¯
23Our conclusion that the optimal steady-state inflation rate is zero can be generalized to other
price-setting mechanisms and a more general preference specification, as shown in Benigno and
Woodford (2004a), and to the case in which only distorting taxes are available as in Benigno and
Woodford (2003a).
24Note that we may assign arbitrary positive values to C¯, H¯ without changing the nature of the
implied preferences, as long as the value of λ is appropriately adjusted.
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for each good at all times and ξt = 0 at all times.
25 As a second-order (logarithmic)
approximation to this measure, we obtain26
Ut0 = Y¯ u¯c · Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ΦYˆt − 1
2
uyyYˆ
2
t + Yˆtuyξξt − u∆∆ˆt
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3), (2.1)
where Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ) and ∆ˆt ≡ log∆t measure deviations of aggregate output and
the price dispersion measure from their steady-state levels, the term “t.i.p.” collects
terms that are independent of policy (constants and functions of exogenous distur-
bances) and hence irrelevant for ranking alternative policies, and ||ξ|| is a bound on
the amplitude of our perturbations of the steady state.27 Here the coefficient
Φ ≡ 1− θ − 1
θ
1− τ¯
µ¯w
< 1
measures the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor, and hence the inefficiency
of the steady-state output level Y¯ . The coefficients uyy, uyξ and u∆ are defined in
Appendix B.
In addition, we can take a second-order approximation to equation (1.20) and
integrate it to obtain
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 ∆ˆt =
α
(1− α)(1− αβ)θ(1+ω)(1+ωθ)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
pi2t
2
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (2.2)
25Here the elements of ξt are assumed to be c¯t ≡ log(C¯t/C¯), h¯t ≡ log(H¯t/H¯), at ≡ log(At/A¯), µˆwt ≡
log(µwt /µ¯w), Gˆt ≡ (Gt−G¯)/Y¯ , and τˆ t ≡ (τ t− τ¯)/τ¯ , so that a value of zero for this vector corresponds
to the steady-state values of all disturbances. The perturbation Gˆt is not defined to be logarithmic
so that we do not have to assume positive steady-state value for this variable.
26See Appendix B for details. Our calculations here follow closely those of Woodford (2003,
chapter 6).
27Specifically, we use the notation O(||ξ||k) as shorthand for O(||ξ, ∆ˆ1/2t0−1, Xˆt0 ||k), where in each
case hats refer to log deviations from the steady-state values of the various parameters of the policy
problem. We treat ∆ˆ1/2t0 as an expansion parameter, rather than ∆ˆt0 because (1.20) implies that
deviations of the inflation rate from zero of order ² only result in deviations in the dispersion measure
∆t from one of order ²2. We are thus entitled to treat the fluctuations in ∆t as being only of second
order in our bound on the amplitude of disturbances, since if this is true at some initial date it will
remain true thereafter. (See Appendix B for further discussion.)
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Substituting (2.2) into (2.1), we can then approximate our welfare measure by
Ut0 = Y¯ u¯c · Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [ΦYˆt − 1
2
uyyYˆ
2
t + Yˆtuyξξt −
1
2
upipi
2
t ]
+t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3), (2.3)
for a certain coefficient upi > 0 defined in Appendix B. Note that we can now write
our stabilization objective purely in terms of the evolution of the aggregate variables
{Yˆt, pit} and the exogenous disturbances.
We note that when Φ > 0, there is a non-zero linear term in (2.3), which means
that we cannot expect to evaluate this expression to second order using only an
approximate solution for the path of aggregate output that is accurate only to first
order. Thus we cannot determine optimal policy, even up to first order, using this
approximate objective together with approximations to the structural equations that
are accurate only to first order. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) avoid this problem
by assuming an output subsidy (i.e., a value τ¯ < 0) of the size needed to ensure that
Φ = 0. Here we wish to relax this assumption. We show here that an alternative way
of dealing with this problem is to use a second-order approximation to the aggregate-
supply relation to eliminate the linear terms in the quadratic welfare measure. We
show in Appendix B that to second order, equation (1.19) can be written in the form
Vt = κ(Yˆt + cξξt +
1
2
cyyYˆ
2
t − Yˆtcyξξt +
1
2
cpipi
2
t ) + βEtVt+1
+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (2.4)
for certain coefficients defined in the appendix. Here the notation “s.o.t.i.p.” indicates
terms independent of policy that are entirely of second or higher order, and we have
defined
Vt ≡ pit + 1
2
vpipi
2
t + vzpitZt, (2.5)
where
Zt ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t[zyYˆT + zpipiT + zξξT ]; (2.6)
again the coefficients are defined in Appendix B. Note that to first order (2.4) reduces
simply to
pit = κ[Yˆt + cξξt] + βEtpit+1, (2.7)
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for a certain coefficient κ > 0. This is the familiar “New Keynesian Phillips curve”
relation.
Integrating forward equation (2.4), we obtain a relation of the form
Vt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0κ[Yˆt +
1
2
cyyYˆ
2
t − Yˆtcyξξt +
1
2
cpipi
2
t ] + t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3). (2.8)
We can then use (2.8) to write the discounted sum of output terms in (2.3) as a
function of purely quadratic terms, up to a residual of third order. As shown in
Appendix B, we can rewrite (2.3) as
Ut0 = −ΩEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{qpi
2
pi2t +
qy
2
(Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t )2
}
+ Tt0 + t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3), (2.9)
where 28
Ω ≡ Y¯ uc > 0,
qpi ≡ θ
κ
[(ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)], (2.10)
qy ≡ ω + σ−1 + Φ(1− σ−1)− Φσ
−1(s−1C − 1)
ω + σ−1
, (2.11)
Yˆ ∗t = ω1Yˆ
n
t − ω2Gˆt + ω3uˆwt + ω4τˆ t, (2.12)
and
Yˆ nt ≡ −cξξt =
σ−1gt + ωqt − µˆwt − ωτ τˆ t
(ω + σ−1)
,
in which expressions
ω1 = q
−1
y [(ω + σ
−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)],
ω2 =
Φs−1C σ
−1
(ω + σ−1)2 + Φ[(1− σ−1)(ω + σ−1)− (s−1C − 1)σ−1]
,
ω3 ≡ 1− Φ
(ω + σ−1) + Φ[(1− σ−1)− (s−1C − 1)σ−1(ω + σ−1)−1]
,
ω4 ≡ ωτ
(ω + σ−1) + Φ[(1− σ−1)− (s−1C − 1)σ−1(ω + σ−1)−1]
.
28In what follows, the following definitions have been used: σ−1 ≡ σ˜−1s−1C with sC ≡ C¯/Y¯ ;
ωqt ≡ νh¯t + φ(1 + ν)at; gt ≡ Gˆt + sC c¯t; ωτ ≡ τ¯ /(1− τ¯); κ ≡ (1− αβ)(1− α)(ω + σ−1)/[α(1 + θω)].
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Here Yˆ nt represents a log-linear approximation to the “natural rate of output,” i.e.,
the flexible-price equilibrium level of output (Woodford, 2003, chap. 3); in terms of
this notation, the log-linear aggregate supply relation (2.7) can be written as
pit = κ[Yˆt − Yˆ nt ] + βEtpit+1. (2.13)
The term Tt0 ≡ ΦY¯ u¯cκ−1Vt0 is a transitory component defined in Appendix B.
Once again, we are interested in characterizing optimal policy from a timeless
perspective. We observe from the form of the structural relations (2.4) and the
definition of Vt that the aspects of the expected future evolution of the endogenous
variables that affect the feasible set of values for inflation, output in any period t
can be summarized (in our second-order approximation to the structural relations)
by the expected values of Vt+1, Zt+1. Hence the only commitments regarding future
outcomes that can be of value in improving stabilization outcomes in period t can be
summarized by commitments at t regarding the state-contingent values of those two
variables in the following period. It follows that we are interested in characterizing
optimal policy from any date t0 onward subject to the constraint that given values
for Vt0 , Zt0 be satisfied,
29 in addition to the constraints represented by the structural
equations.
But given predetermined values for Vt0 the value of the transitory component Tt0
is predetermined. Hence, over the set of admissible policies, higher values of (2.9)
correspond to lower values of
Lt0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{qpi
2
pi2t +
qy
2
(Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t )2
}
. (2.14)
It follows that we may rank policies in terms of the implied value of the discounted
quadratic loss function Lt0 . Because this loss function is purely quadratic (i.e., lacking
linear terms), it is possible to evaluate it to second order using only a first-order
approximation to the equilibrium evolution of inflation and output under a given
policy. Hence the log-linear approximate structural relation (2.7) (or equivalently,
(2.13)) is sufficiently accurate for our purposes. Similarly, it suffices that we use
log-linear approximations to the variable Vt0 in describing the initial commitments,
29Note that a specification of initial values for these two variables corresponds, in our quadratic
approximation to the structural equations, to a specification of initial values for the three variables
Ft0 ,Kt0 in section 1.
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which are given by Vˆt0 = pit0 . Then an optimal policy from a timeless perspective is a
policy from date t0 onward that minimizes the quadratic loss function Lt0 subject to
the constraints implied by the linear structural relation (2.13) holding in each period
t ≥ t0 and subject also to the constraints that a certain predetermined value for Vˆt0
be achieved.30 This last constraint may equivalently be expressed as a constraint on
the initial inflation rate,
pit0 = p¯it0 . (2.15)
(The definition of the constraint value p¯it0 under a policy that is optimal from a
timeless perspective is discussed further in Woodford, 2003, chap. 7, sec. 2.1.)
The policy objective Lt0 now depends only on the evolution of the inflation rate
and the welfare-relevant output gap
yt ≡ Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t .
It is useful to write the linear constraints implied by our model’s structural equations
in terms of the welfare-relevant output gap as well. The aggregate-supply relation
(2.13) can be alternatively expressed as
pit = κyt + βEtpit+1 + ut, (2.16)
where ut is a composite “cost-push” term, indicating the degree to which the exoge-
nous disturbances preclude simultaneous stabilization of inflation and the welfare-
relevant output gap. In terms of our previous notation for the exogenous disturbances
in the model, this is given by
ut ≡ κ(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ nt )
= κ(ω1 − 1)Yˆ nt − κω2Gˆt + κω3uˆwt + κω4τˆ t.
It is important for the discussion below to note that pure markup shocks are not the
only source of movements in the cost-push term ut.
We have thus shown that an objective for policy of the form (2.14), as discussed in
the introduction, can indeed be justified on welfare-theoretic grounds. This requires
that the “output gap” in such an objective be interpreted in the way defined here,
30The constraint associated with a predetermined value for Zt0 can be neglected, in a first-order
characterization of optimal policy, because the variable Zt does not appear in the first-order approx-
imation to the aggregate-supply relation.
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i.e., as the percentage deviation of output from a variable target level of output that
depends on the evolution of exogenous disturbances of many sorts. (There is thus no
reason, in general, for the welfare-theoretic target level of output to correspond to a
smooth trend.) We have also seen that exogenous disturbances may indeed preclude
simultaneous stabilization of inflation and the welfare-relevant output gap; the extent
to which this is true depends on the degree of variability of the disturbance term ut
defined above. We now turn to the consequences of this characterization for the
nature of optimal policy.
3 Optimal Inflation Stabilization
We now use our linear-quadratic approximate policy problem to characterize optimal
policy in the event of small enough disturbances. We begin by establishing conditions
under which the second-order conditions for loss minimization are satisfied, so that
the first-order conditions determine a loss-minimizing policy, and hence approximate
at least a local welfare maximum. These are also conditions under which welfare
cannot be increased (at least locally) by arbitrary randomization of policy. We then
use the first-order conditions to characterize the optimal responses of inflation and
output to exogenous disturbances, and discuss the conditions under which optimal
policy corresponds to complete price stability.
3.1 Conditions for the Desirability of Policy Randomization
We have shown in the previous section that our approximate policy problem consists
of choosing processes {pit, Yˆt} for dates t ≥ t0 to minimize the loss function Lt0
defined in (2.14), subject to the constraint that the log-linear approximate aggregate
supply relation (2.16) hold each period, and that the initial inflation rate satisfy a
constraint of the form (2.15). We first consider whether a solution to the first-order
conditions associated with this problem necessarily represents a loss minimum. This
is necessarily true if the loss function is convex, as it will be if qpi, qy > 0; but as we
shall see, our approximate loss function is not necessarily (globally) convex, yet our
LQ approximation may nonetheless suffice to characterize (locally) optimal policy.
Here we examine the somewhat weaker conditions under which this will still be true.
As a closely related question, we consider the issue of whether purely random
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policy — randomization of policy by the monetary authority, uncorrelated with any
random variation in economic “fundamentals” — can be welfare-improving. Again,
in the case of a convex loss function, of the kind conventionally assumed in analyses of
monetary stabilization policy with ad hoc objectives, it can be shown that arbitrary
randomization is never optimal. But if our approximate loss function need not be
convex, the answer is not obvious, and Dupor (2003) exhibits a general-equilibrium
model with sticky prices in which randomization of monetary policy can be welfare-
improving. Here we use our LQ approximation method to establish general conditions
under which a result like Dupor’s will obtain in a model with Calvo-style staggered
pricing.
Both questions turn on the positive definiteness of a certain quadratic form defined
by the coefficients of the LQ problem. Suppose that {pit, Yˆt} are stochastic processes
consistent with both the equilibrium relation (2.16) at all dates t ≥ t0 and the initial
constraint (2.15), and let us then consider the perturbed processes
p˜it ≡ pit + ψpit , Y˜t ≡ Yˆt + ψyt , (3.1)
for some stochastic processes {ψpit , ψyt }. Each of these stochastic processes {xt} is
assumed to be such that
Et0
∑
t=t0
βt−t0x2t <∞, (3.2)
so that the loss function Lt0 is well-defined for both the original and the perturbed
processes. The perturbed processes will also represent a possible rational-expectations
equilibrium consistent with (2.15) if the processes {ψpit , ψyt } satisfy
ψpit = κψ
y
t + βEtψ
pi
t+1 (3.3)
for all t ≥ t0, and
ψpit0 = 0. (3.4)
Now consider the Hilbert space H of stochastic processes ψ ≡ {ψpit , ψyt } for dates
t ≥ t0 satisfying the bounds (3.2) for x = ψpi, ψy.31 Then the quadratic form
L(ψ) ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[qpi
2
ψpi2t +
qy
2
ψy2t
]
(3.5)
31This can be shown to be a Hilbert space if the inner product of two processes ψ1, ψ2 is defined
as Et0
∑∞
t=t0
βt−t0 [ψ1,pit ψ
2,pi
t + ψ
1,y
t ψ
2,y
t ].
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is well defined for any processes ψ ∈ H. Furthermore, let the linear subspace H1
be the set of processes ψ ∈ H that satisfy (3.4) in addition to satisfying (3.3) for
each t ≥ t0. Then the quadratic form (3.5) is positive definite on the subspace H1 if
L(ψ) > 0 for any processes ψ ∈ H1 that are not identically zero (i.e., equal to zero
almost surely at all dates). This is the critical condition for both of the issues with
which we are concerned, as indicated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Randomization of monetary policy reduces the expected losses
Lt0 — and hence is locally welfare-reducing in the exact problem as well — if and
only if the quadratic form (3.5) is positive definite on the subspace H1. Furthermore,
if and only if this is true, processes {pit, Yˆt} that satisfy the first-order conditions
for the LQ optimization problem [discussed further in section 3.3] represent a loss
minimum, and hence an approximation to (at least a local) welfare maximum in the
exact problem.
Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient conditions for (3.5) to be positive defi-
nite on H1 reduce to the following: qpi and qy are not both equal to zero; and either
(i) qy ≥ 0 and
qpi + (1− β1/2)2κ−2qy > 0, (3.6)
holds, or (ii) qy ≤ 0 and
qpi + (1 + β
1/2)2κ−2qy > 0, (3.7)
holds.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Note that in the case that both qy, qpi ≥ 0, (3.6) is satisfied as long as least one
coefficient is strictly positive; thus the case of a convex loss function is one in which
the second-order conditions are necessarily satisfied and randomization of policy is
necessarily welfare-reducing. However, Proposition 3 shows that the requirement of
convexity of the loss function can be weakened while retaining these results.
In fact, in the case of isoelastic functional forms, convexity is likely to obtain for
quantitatively reasonable parameter values, even if it is not a necessary consequence
of the general assumptions made above. In the isoelastic case, qy and qpi are given
by (2.11) and (2.10) respectively. It follows from this expression and our general
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assumptions that qpi > 0, though it remains possible in the isoelastic case for qy to be
negative. Furthermore, one observes that a necessary condition for qy to be negative
is that sC < 1/2, or alternatively that sG > 1/2, which is larger share of government
purchases in total demand than is typical of industrial economies.
Even if qy < 0, Proposition 3 shows that randomization of policy will still be
welfare-reducing, as long as
qy ≥ − κ
2qpi
(1 + β1/2)2
. (3.8)
Violation of this bound requires an even more extreme role of the government in
the economy, though it remains a technical possibility, consistent with our general
neoclassical assumptions.32 We show elsewhere (Benigno and Woodford, 2004a) that
it is possible for randomization to be welfare-improving without such an extremely
large share of government purchases in total demand, in the case of more general
functional forms. Nonetheless, this possibility seems to be of more theoretical than
practical interest.
3.2 The Case for Price Stability
Under certain circumstances, our characterization of the approximate loss function
yields immediate conclusions regarding the nature of optimal policy. These are the
conditions under which optimal policy involves complete stabilization of the inflation
rate at zero, i.e., complete price stability. While the conditions under which this
is exactly true are fairly special, they are nonetheless of interest, insofar as price
stability may be a good approximation to optimal policy as long as the conditions
are not too grossly violated.
The quadratic loss function Lt0 defined in (2.14) is clearly minimized by a policy
under which inflation is zero at all times if two conditions are met: (i) the coefficients
of the loss function satisfy qy, qpi > 0; and (ii) the exogenous terms Yˆ
n
t and Yˆ
∗
t coincide
at all times. Condition (ii) implies that a policy under which inflation is zero at all
times will also involve Yˆt = Yˆ
∗
t at all times, as a consequence of (2.16).
33 Condition
32For given values 0 < β < 1, ω ≥ 0, σ−1 > 0, Φ > 0, κ > 0, and θ > 1, choice of a value of sG
close enough to 1 — and hence a value of sC close enough to zero — will make qy an arbitrarily
large negative quantity, while qpi and the other expressions on the right-hand side of (3.8) remain
finite. Hence it is possible to find parameter values for which (3.8) is violated.
33Here we assume that a policy under which inflation is zero at all times is feasible. In the model
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(i) then implies that such an equilibrium necessarily achieves the lowest possible value
for expected losses, since expected losses are zero and the loss function is necessarily
non-negative.
In fact, condition (i) can be weakened; it suffices that qy and qpi satisfy the condi-
tions stated in Proposition 3. In Appendix A we establish the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Yˆ nt = Yˆ
∗
t at all times, and that the conditions
stated in Proposition 3 are satisfied. Then the policy that uniquely minimizes Lt0 is
the one under which pit = 0 at all times, regardless of the realizations of the exogenous
disturbances [as long as these are small enough to make such an equilibrium possible].
This means that in the exact model as well, a policy under which inflation is zero at
all times is optimal from a timeless perspective. That is, under the initial constraint
that pit0 = 0, expected utility is maximized by a policy under which pit = 0 for all
t ≥ t0.
The condition that Yˆ nt = Yˆ
∗
t at all times, assumed in Proposition 4, is not quite
so special a situation as might be imagined. It is consistent with the existence of
a number of distinct types of independent disturbances, as long as certain model
parameters take special values. Comparing the definitions of Yˆ nt and Yˆ
∗
t above, one
sees that [for the isoelastic case considered in section 2] both expressions will be
affected to exactly the same extent by technology shocks, by shocks to household
impatience to consume, and by shocks to the disutility of labor supply, in the case
that ω1 = 1. This condition in turn holds if Φ(s
−1
C − 1) = 0, which holds if either
Φ = 0 or sG = 0. Furthermore, both expressions are affected to exactly the same
extent by variations in government purchases as well, if in addition ω2 = 0, which
holds if Φ = 0. However, variations in the wage markup or in the level of distorting
taxes necessarily affect the two expressions differently, except in a special case that
would imply that they are no longer affected in the same way by any disturbances to
tastes or technology. We thus obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. Consider a model with the isoelastic functional forms (1.3) –
(1.4), and parameter values ω ≥ 0, σ−1 > 0, and suppose that there are random
proposed here, this is necessarily the case as long as disturbances are small enough, so that the
nominal interest rate required for an equilibrium with zero inflation is non-negative at all times.
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fluctuations in the composite disturbance term ωqt + σ
−1c¯t. [This is generally true
if either preferences or technology are random.] Then Yˆ nt = Yˆ
∗
t at all times — so
that the “cost-push” term in the aggregate-supply relation (2.16) is zero at all times
— if and only if (i) there are no random variations in the wage markup or the tax
rate (µˆwt = τˆ t = 0 at all times); and (ii) either (a) the steady-state level of output is
efficient (Φ = 0) or (b) there are no government purchases (Gt = 0 at all times).
The result that there is no “cost-push” term in the aggregate-supply relation in
the case that Φ = 0, as long as there are no markup fluctuations or variations in
the level of distorting taxes, has already been obtained in Woodford (2003, chap. 6),
following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Here there is also a simple intuition for
the fact that price stability is optimal, first stated by Goodfriend and King (1997):
the model is one in which, if prices were perfectly flexible, the equilibrium allocation
of resources would be optimal. Even with staggered price adjustment, a policy that
achieves zero inflation at all times leads to an equilibrium allocation of resources that
is the same as if prices were flexible; hence the policy is optimal.
More interesting is the conclusion that even when the steady-state is inefficient
(Φ > 0), a policy of complete price stability is still optimal (from a timeless perspec-
tive34) in the isoelastic case, as long as there are no government purchases. (The
absence of government purchases is actually necessary in order for this case to be
isoelastic in the relevant sense; for it is only if Gt = 0 that (1.3) implies that the
marginal utility of income will be an isoelastic function of the level of output Yt, and
not simply of the level of consumption Ct.)
This result provides an analytical explanation of certain numerical results obtained
by Khan et al. (2003) in a closely related model.35 Khan et al. assume isoelastic
functional forms, as we have, and also calibrate their model so that in the steady state
34That is, it is optimal among policies that satisfy an initial precommitment (2.15) with p¯it0 = 0,
though it is not optimal in the absence of such a constraint, except when Φ = 0. See the comparison
of Ramsey policy to timelessly optimal policy in the low-Φ case treated in Woodford, 2003, chap.
7, sec. 1.1.
35The model considered by Khan et al., in the variant that abstracts from monetary frictions, is
essentially the same as ours, except for a different form of staggering of pricing decisions: in their
model, the probability that a price is revised each period depends on the number of periods since
the last revision of that price, rather than being a constant as in the Calvo model. We discuss the
consequences of this more general form of staggering in Benigno and Woodford (2004a).
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there are no government purchases (sG = 0), even though they consider the effects
of small departures of Gt from the steady-state value of zero. When they consider
the optimal policy response to a technology shock, and use a linearization method36
to compute a linear approximation to the optimal response — i.e., to compute the
derivative of the optimal paths with respect to the amplitude of the technology shock,
evaluated at the case of a zero disturbance (the steady state) — they are in effect
computing a linear approximation to optimal policy in a model in which there are no
government purchases, since they compute a perturbation which involves no change
in the level of government purchases to a steady state with no government purchases.
In fact, Khan et al. find that the optimal response to a technology shock involves no
change in the inflation rate (which continues to equal zero, the optimal steady-state
inflation rate in their model as in ours), and a response of output that is the same
as would occur in a model with flexible prices (i.e., Yˆt = Yˆ
n
t ).
37 This is just what
Propositions 4 and 5 would imply for our model.
Instead, they find that the optimal response to a variation in government pur-
chases involves some change in the inflation rate, and an output response that differs
slightly from the flexible-price equilibrium response. This too is what our analysis
would predict, in the case that Φ > 0. Thus our results provide analytical insight into
the reason for the numerical results obtained by Khan et al. for a particular numerical
calibration, which allows us to better understand their degree of generality. On the
one hand, we find that their conclusion with regard to technology shocks does not
depend on their precise parameter values, except the choice to assume that sG = 0.
However, our analysis also indicates that they would not have obtained the same
result under a more realistic calibration in which sG > 0; so this simplification was
not innocuous. Our further analysis in Benigno and Woodford (2004a) also shows
that their result would not obtain, in general, in the case of non-isoelastic functional
forms, even under the assumption that sG = 0.
36The method that they use to compute a linear approximation to optimal policy involves first
writing the exact (nonlinear) first-order conditions that characterize optimal policy, then linearizing
these first-order conditions, and solving the linearized equations. This method yields an identical
linear approximation to optimal policy as the solution to our LQ problem though, as we have
explained in section 2, we believe there are advantages to proceeding from an LQ approximate
policy problem.
37King and Wolman (1999) obtain a similar conclusion in a model where government purchases
are not considered at all.
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3.3 Optimal Responses to “Cost-Push” Disturbances
While in the previous section we have described cases in which complete price stability
is optimal, we have also found that this is exactly true only in fairly special cases,
when we allow (realistically) for a distorted steady state. In general, the “cost-push”
term ut will be non-zero. This is obviously true if there is time variation in the size of
tax distortions or in wage markups, since disturbances of this kind affect the flexible-
price equilibrium level of output while they are irrelevant for the efficient allocation
of resources. But our results above show that even if there are no disturbances of
those types, shocks to tastes or technology, or variations in government purchases,
also generally give rise to fluctuations in the cost-push term. In any such case, it is
not possible simultaneously to fully stabilize both inflation and the welfare-relevant
output gap; the optimal trade-off between the two stabilization objectives generally
involves some degree of variation in both variables in response to disturbances.
In order to consider optimal policy in this more general case, it suffices that we
specify the stochastic process for fluctuations in the composite cost-push term {ut};
the underlying source of those fluctuations does not matter, at least as far as the
optimal fluctuations in inflation and in the welfare-relevant output gap are concerned.
(The optimal responses of other variables, such as output, employment, or private
consumption, will instead generally depend on what kind of real disturbances have
occurred.) It follows from the approximation introduced in section 2 that a log-linear
approximation to the optimal evolution of inflation and the output gap are given by
the processes {pit, yt} that minimize Lt0 , subject to the constraints that the aggregate-
supply relation (2.16) be satisfied each period, and that the initial inflation rate satisfy
a constraint of the form (2.15). The solution to this problem plainly depends only on
the stochastic evolution of the composite cost-push term. Thus from this point we
make treat the specification of the transitory fluctuations {ut} as a primitive.
The form of the optimization problem just stated is the same as in a model where
the steady state is assumed to be efficient (Φ = 0); the only differences made by
allowing Φ to be positive have to do with the expressions that we have derived for
qpi and qy as functions of underlying model parameters, the expression for ut as a
function of underlying disturbances, and the definition of the welfare-relevant output
gap yt. The solution to the problem is therefore the same (in the case of a given
{ut} process and given values of qpi and qy) as in the Φ = 0 case treated in Woodford
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(2003, chap. 7).38 We recall here some of the main results presented there, which
directly apply to the present case as well.
The first-order conditions for the optimization problem just stated are of the form
qpipit + ϕt − ϕt−1 = 0, (3.9)
qyyt − κϕt = 0, (3.10)
for each t ≥ t0, where ϕt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
(2.16) in period t. Bounded processes {pit, yt, ϕt} that satisfy (2.16) and (3.9) –
(3.10) for each t ≥ t0 and are consistent with the initial condition (2.15) represent an
optimum. Using (3.9) to eliminate pit and (3.10) to eliminate yt,
39 (2.16) becomes an
equation for the evolution of the multiplier
βqyEtϕt+1 − [(1 + β)qy + κ2qpi]ϕt + qyϕt−1 = qpiqyut. (3.11)
The initial condition (2.15) can similarly be expressed as a constraint on the path of
the multipliers
ϕt0 − ϕt0−1 = −qpip¯it0 . (3.12)
An optimum can then be described by a bounded process {ϕt} for all dates t ≥ t0−1
that satisfies (3.11) for each t ≥ t0 and is also consistent with (3.12).
Equation (3.11) has a unique bounded solution consistent with (3.12) if and only
if the characteristic equation
βqyµ
2 − [(1 + β)qy + κ2qpi]µ+ qy = 0 (3.13)
has exactly one root such that |µ| < 1. This requires that the characteristic equation
have real roots, exactly one of which lies in the interval between -1 and 1; this in turn
is true if and only if40 qpi 6= 0 and
qy
qpi
> − κ
2
2(1 + β)
. (3.14)
38See also Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for analysis of an LQ problem of this form.
39Here we assume that both qpi, qy 6= 0. Note that if either qpi or qy happens to equal zero, optimal
policy is easily characterized: it consists simply of the complete stabilization of the variable with
the non-zero weight in the loss function.
40Note that while we have assumed qy 6= 0 in the above derivation, (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13) are
also correct even when qy = 0.
29
Note that in the case that Φ = 0 (treated in Woodford, 2003, chap. 7), this condition
is necessarily satisfied, since in that case qpi, qy > 0. We then obtain the following
result.
Proposition 6. Suppose that qpi 6= 0, and that (3.14) is satisfied in addition to
the conditions listed in Proposition 3. Then in the case of any small enough value
of p¯it0 , and any sufficiently tightly bounded fluctuations in the cost-push disturbance
process {ut}, the solution to the optimization problem stated in Proposition 2 involves
fluctuations {pit, yt} that remain forever within any given neighborhood of the steady-
state values (0, 0). These optimal dynamics are furthermore approximated (arbitrarily
well, in the case of tight enough bounds on p¯it0 and on the amplitude of the cost-push
terms) by the log-linear dynamics corresponding to the unique bounded solution to
equations (2.16), (3.9) and (3.10) consistent with initial condition (2.15).
This solution is obtained by solving (3.9) and (3.10) for pit and yt respectively,
where the multiplier process {ϕt} is specified recursively by the relation
ϕt = µϕt−1 − qpi
∞∑
j=0
βjµj+1Etut+j. (3.15)
Here µ is the root of (3.13) that satisfies −1 < µ < 1, and the initial value ϕt0−1 is
chosen so that that the solution is consistent with (2.15).
The proof follows exactly the same lines as in the case with Φ = 0 treated in Woodford
(2003, chap. 7). Further details are given there of how one may compute the value
of ϕt0−1 corresponding to a given initial commitment (2.15), and examples are given
there of self-consistent initial commitments associated with policy that is optimal
“from a timeless perspective.”
In the isoelastic case, as discussed above, qpi > 0. One can then show further-
more that condition (3.14) implies condition (3.8), though the former condition is
stronger.41 Hence it suffices that (3.14) hold in order for Proposition 6 to apply.
Since this is necessarily satisfied if qy ≥ 0, it also follows from our discussion above
41Whenever (3.8) is satisfied, so that a bounded solution to the first-order conditions would
correspond to an optimum, there is necessarily no more than one bounded solution. However, there
might be no bounded solution, as the optimal policy might involve mildly explosive dynamics. This
is the case in which (3.8) is satisfied though (3.14) is not. We do not wish to consider such cases
here, as our local LQ approximation to the policy problem could not be guaranteed to remain an
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that if sG ≤ 1/2, the condition is necessarily satisfied. Thus in the isoelastic case,
Proposition 6 necessarily applies, unless government purchases are a large share of
total output. (But once again, it remains possible for the condition not to hold;
indeed, it is possible for (3.14) to fail even though (3.8) is satisfied.)
As an example of the implications of Proposition 6, consider the case of exogenous
fluctuations in the level of government purchases, according to a first-order autore-
gressive process of the form
Gˆt = ρGGˆt−1 + ²
G
t , (3.16)
where 0 ≤ ρG < 1 and {²Gt } is an i.i.d., bounded, mean-zero exogenous shock process.
It follows from the definition of the cost-push term in section 2 that in this case,
ut = γGGˆt, with a coefficient
γG ≡ −κΦ
σ−1
(ω + σ−1)qy
.
In this case, (3.15) reduces to
ϕt = µϕt−1 + φGGˆt,
where
φG ≡ −
qpiµγG
1− βµρG
.
It then follows that an innovation ²Gt to the level of government purchases affects
the current level and expected future path of the Lagrange multiplier by an amount
Etϕt+j − Et−1ϕt+j =
µj+1 − ρj+1G
µ− ρG
φG²
G
t
for each j ≥ 0. Given this impulse response for the multiplier, (3.9) – (3.10) can be
used to derive corresponding impulse responses for prices and the output gap,
Etpt+j − Et−1pt+j = − 1
qpi
µj+1 − ρj+1G
µ− ρG
φG²
G
t , (3.17)
Etyt+j − Et−1yt+j = κ
qy
µj+1 − ρj+1G
µ− ρG
φG²
G
t , (3.18)
accurate approximation in such a case. Hence we shall require that the stronger condition (3.14)
be satisfied. In the case of an exact LQ problem, this condition would not be required in order for
(3.11) to determine a well-defined optimal policy.
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where in (3.17) we use the notation pt ≡ logPt.
If we further specialize to the case in which G¯ = 0, so that sC = 1 (as in the
calibration of Khan et al., 2003), then in the case of any Φ > 0 we have
qy = ω + Φ+ σ
−1(1− Φ) > 0,
qpi =
θ
κ
qy > 0,
as a consequence of which one can show that 0 < µ < 1. We also observe in this case
that γG < 0, as a result of which φG > 0. It then follows that each of the coefficients
of the impulse response function (3.17) is negative, while each of the coefficients of
the impulse response function (3.18) is positive. That is, an unexpected increase in
government purchases results in a decrease in prices and an increase in the (welfare-
relevant) output gap; both impulse responses return asymptotically to zero, without
ever overshooting their long-run levels.
This provides us with an analytical explanation of the results of Khan et al. (2003)
in a closely related model. They also find that the optimal response to an increase
in government purchases involves a temporary reduction in prices, together with a
greater contraction of private consumption (and a smaller increase in output) than
would occur in the flexible-price equilibrium, or than would result from a monetary
policy that completely stabilized inflation. Our analytical results here yield the same
conclusion. Because γG < 0, an increase in government purchases causes a negative
“cost-push shock,” meaning that it is not possible to maintain Yˆt equal to Yˆ
∗
t without
deflation (as Yˆ ∗t rises less than does the natural rate Yˆ
n
t ). The optimal tradeoff
between the objectives of inflation stabilization and output-gap stabilization requires
one to accept some deflation, though not as much as would be required to maintain
Yˆt equal to Yˆ
∗
t .
This involves an increase in the welfare-relevant output gap, and since Yˆ ∗t = ψGGˆt,
where
ψG =
σ−1
ω + σ−1
ω + σ−1(1− Φ)
ω + Φ+ σ−1(1− Φ) > 0,
the target level of output also increases; hence output increases relative to trend in
response to such a shock. Nonetheless, optimal policy involves output temporarily
lower than the flexible-price equilibrium level Yˆ nt , as found by Khan et al. The price-
level response (3.17) implies that Etpt+1 falls by an amount that is µ+ ρG < 2 times
as large as the decline in pt; hence Etpit+1 does not decline by as much as does pit
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(if it falls at all). It then follows from (2.13) that Yˆt − Yˆ nt must fall in response to
a positive innovation ²Gt . Thus output rises less (at least in the period of the shock)
under optimal policy than it would in a flexible-price equilibrium; or alternatively,
consumption falls by more than it would in a flexible-price equilibrium, as reported
by Khan et al. Our results for a model with Calvo pricing are thus qualitatively
similar to theirs for a model with an alternative form of staggering of price changes,
and we are also able to obtain precise analytical expressions for the size of the effects
in question.
4 Extensions
We have provided rigorous welfare-theoretic foundations for the form of linear-quadratic
policy problem postulated in Clarida et al. (1999), among many other recent studies,
in terms of the maximization of the expected utility of the representative household
in a canonical “new Keynesian” model with monopolistic competition and staggered
price-setting of the kind introduced by Calvo (1983). We have furthermore shown
that this is possible even without the special assumption relied upon by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2002), according to which an output subsidy
offsets the steady-state distortions that would otherwise result from the existence of
market power on the part of the suppliers of differentiated goods. We find that a
linear-quadratic policy problem of the same form is obtained even in the case of a
distorted steady, indeed, one that may be substantially distorted, as a result of the
tax system as well as market power. With a few caveats (such as the theoretical pos-
sibility of a failure of the coefficient qy to be positive), we find that the conclusions
of studies such as Clarida et al. (1999) regarding optimal monetary policy continue
to apply in this case.
In Benigno and Woodford (2004a), we show that these conclusions can be gener-
alized still further. In particular, we show that the special isoelastic functional forms
for preferences and technology assumed here are not necessary, except to simplify
our calculations. In the case of completely general differentiable functions, we show
that it is possible to derive a quadratic approximation to expected utility of the form
(2.14); the only difference is that in the general case the expressions for the coeffi-
cients qpi, qy, and the definition of the exogenous target level of output Yˆ
∗
t are more
complicated. Proposition 3 continues to state the correct second-order conditions for
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the linear-quadratic optimization problem; but in the general case, it is theoretically
possible for qpi as well as qy to be negative, and there are additional theoretically pos-
sible cases in which the second-order conditions fail to hold. (We nonetheless continue
to regard the cases in which the SOCs fail to hold as being of little practical interest.)
In the general case there are also additional ways in which exogenous disturbances
can give rise to “cost-push” terms in the aggregate-supply relation; for example, it is
no longer true, in general, that a technology shock gives rise to no cost-push term,
even in the case that G¯ = 0. Thus the case in which price stability is exactly optimal
appears an even more special case; yet it remains true that for empirically realistic
parameterizations, an optimal policy will involve only very small departures from a
zero inflation rate.
We also show that a similar linear-quadratic policy problem can be defined in the
case of staggering schemes other than Calvo’s, i.e., when the probability of revision
of a given price is not independent of the length of time that it has been in effect;
we discuss a more general framework that can deal with cases such as the fixed-
length price commitments considered in Chari et al. (2000) and the more complex
parameterization assumed by Khan et al. (2003). In this case, the welfare-theoretic
loss function is no longer as simple as (2.14). However, it can still be expressed
as a sum of squared price-differential terms (that all equal zero if and only if the
aggregate price index never varies) and a squared output-gap term, so that once again
price stability is optimal if and only if there are no “cost-push” disturbances to the
aggregate-supply relation, and the sources of cost-push disturbances are essentially
the same as in the case of Calvo pricing.
In Benigno and Woodford (2004b), we extend the present framework by allowing
for sticky wages as well as prices. This allows us to generalize the welfare analysis of
Erceg et al. (2000), again without relying upon the output and employment subsidies
assumed by those authors, following the lead of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
Again we find that even in the case of a distorted steady state, we can derive a
purely quadratic loss function, though this now includes a term proportional to the
squared rate of nominal wage growth, in addition to the terms present in (2.14). As
emphasized by Erceg et al., this implies that in general complete stabilization of the
inflation rate is not optimal. We find furthermore that in the case of a distorted steady
state, the tensions among the three alternative stabilization objectives represented
by the three terms in the welfare-theoretic loss function are greater than is indicated
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by the numerical results of Erceg et al. under the assumption of an efficient steady
state.
In Benigno and Benigno (2004), the present analysis is extended to the case of a
two-country model. In the case of an open economy, the device used by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) is unavailable even in the presence of subsidies that offset the
distortions due to market power, since it is no longer possible to express the consump-
tion of the representative household by an exact function of domestic production and
express utility in terms of the level of production only. The linear terms in the Taylor
series expansion for the utility of the representative household of each country can
nonetheless be eliminated using the method illustrated here, allowing derivation of a
purely quadratic objective for each country that approximates the expected utility of
its representative household.
Finally, in Benigno and Woodford (2003), we extend the present analysis to con-
sider the jointly optimal determination of monetary and fiscal policy. The tax-rate
process {τ t} is considered to be freely chosen by a fiscal authority, rather than treated
as exogenous as in this paper, and lump-sum taxes are assumed not to exist, so that
an intertemporal solvency condition for the government becomes an additional con-
straint on possible state-contingent paths for the economy. The welfare-theoretic
stabilization objective is again shown to be of the form (2.14), though the coefficients
qpi, qy and the target output process {Yˆ ∗t } are defined somewhat differently, owing to
the existence of the additional constraint.
The nature of the tensions between inflation stabilization and output-gap stabi-
lization are also somewhat different when fiscal considerations are taken into account.
On the one hand, fluctuations in the cost-push term ut do not necessarily imply any
conflict between the two stabilization goals, as another policy instrument (variation
in the tax rate τ t) can be used to offset cost-push shocks. But on the other hand,
there will be a conflict between the two goals, even in the absence of any cost-push
effects, to the extent that shocks cause variations in the requirements for intertem-
poral government solvency (variations in “fiscal stress”). Hence the case in which
complete price stability is optimal is found to be even more restrictive. Nonetheless,
inflation stabilization is found to be an important goal (for both monetary and fiscal
policy), and in our numerical analysis of the optimal response to fiscal disturbances,
we conclude that inflation should fluctuate very little under an optimal policy.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1. Given ∆t0−1, let the process {xt} be determined by (i) choosing
xt0 and state-contingent commitments Xt0+1(ξt0+1) to solve the first-stage problem
stated in section 1.2, and (ii) for each possible state of the world ξt0+1, choosing the
evolution of xt for t ≥ t0+1 so as to maximize Ut0+1, among all of the paths consistent
with (1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0 + 1, given ∆t0 , and that are also consistent
with the value of Xt0+1(ξt0+1) determined in the first stage. Then the process {xt}
represents a Ramsey policy; that is, it maximizes Ut0 among all of the paths consistent
with (1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0, given ∆t0−1.
Proof: First, note that the process {xt} associated with the solution to the two-
stage problem is a feasible plan for the Ramsey problem; that is, it satisfies (1.19)
and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0, given ∆t0−1. For conditions (1.19) and (1.20) are satisfied
for t = t0 as a consequence of conditions (i) – (iii) of the first-stage problem, while
they are satisfied for all dates t ≥ t0 + 1 as a consequence of the constraints on the
second-stage problem. It then remains to show that there cannot be any other process
{x˜t} that also satisfies all of the constraints of the Ramsey problem, and that attains
a higher level of ex ante expected utility Ut0 .
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there exists such a process {x˜t}, and
let X˜t0+1(·) be the implied state-contingent values for Xt0+1 in each of the possible
states of the world at date t0+1, let U˜t0+1(ξt0+1) be the utility looking forward from
any given state of the world at date t0+1 under that plan, and let U˜t0 be the implied
level of ex ante expected utility under the plan. By hypothesis, U˜t0 > Ut0 , where the
latter quantity represents the level of ex ante expected utility implied by the solution
to the two-stage problem.
Note then that the values (x˜t0 , X˜t0+1(·)) satisfy conditions (i) – (iii) of the first-
stage problem. It is then possible to define Jˆ [x˜t0 , X˜t0+1(·)](ξt0). Because the process
{x˜t} for t ≥ t0 + 1 is one possible plan consistent with (1.19) and (1.20) for each
t ≥ t0 + 1, given ∆˜t0 , and also consistent with the precommitment X˜t0+1(ξt0+1) in
each possible state of the world at date t0 + 1, we must have
V (∆˜t0 , X˜t0+1; ξt0+1) ≥ U˜t0+1(ξt0+1)
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for each possible state ξt0+1. It follows from this that
Jˆ [x˜t0 , X˜t0+1(·)](ξt0) ≥ U˜t0 .
But then
Jˆ [x˜t0 , X˜t0+1(·)](ξt0) > Ut0 ,
which contradicts the assumption that the process {xt} solves the first-stage opti-
mization problem. Hence no such alternative process {x˜t} can exist, and the process
{xt} represents a Ramsey policy.
Proposition 2. Given some (∆t0−1, Xt0) ∈ F(ξt0), consider the sequential de-
cision problem in which in each period t ≥ t0, (xt, Xt+1(·)) are chosen to maximize
Jˆ [xt, Xt+1(·)](ξt), subject to constraints (i) – (iii) of the “first stage” problem stated
above, given the predetermined state variable ∆t−1 and the precommitted values Xt.
Then the process {xt} that is chosen in this way is the process that maximizes Ut0
among all of the paths consistent with (1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0, given ∆t0−1,
and also consistent with the specified values Xt0 .
Proof: Consider the problem of choosing a process {xt} to maximize Ut0 among
all of the paths consistent with (1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0, given ∆t0−1, and also
consistent with the specified valuesXt0 . This is the same kind of optimization problem
as in Proposition 1, except for the additional constraint that Xt0 take the specified
values. Using a proof exactly analogous to the one used to establish Proposition 1,
one can show that this problem is equivalent to a two-stage problem in which (i) one
chooses xt0 and state-contingent commitments Xt0+1(ξt0+1) to solve the first-stage
problem stated in section 1.2, except with the additional stipulation that equations
(1.21) – (1.22) are satisfied by the specified values for Xt0 ; and (ii) for each possible
state of the world ξt0+1, one chooses the evolution of xt for t ≥ t0+1 so as to maximize
Ut0+1, among all of the paths consistent with (1.19) and (1.20) for each t ≥ t0 + 1,
given ∆t0 , and that are also consistent with the value of Xt0+1(ξt0+1) determined in
the first stage. This establishes that in the optimal plan, (xt0 , Xt0+1(·)) solve a “first
stage” problem of the kind described in the proposition.
Note furthermore that the “second stage” problem here is exactly the same form
of optimization problem as the one considered in the proposition. One can then use
the same proof to show that it is itself equivalent to a two-stage problem of the same
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kind. This then implies that in the optimal plan, (xt0+1, Xt0+2(·)) solve a “first stage”
problem of the kind described in the proposition. The same argument can be applied,
iteratively (t−t0+1 times), to establish that for any period t ≥ t0, in the optimal plan
(xt, Xt+1(·)) solve a “first stage” problem of the kind described in the proposition.
Now suppose that for each t ≥ t0, (xt, Xt+1(·)) are chosen to solve the “first
stage” problem described in the proposition, given the solution for previous periods,
as assumed in the hypothesis. It follows from the argument just given that in any
period t, the vector xt chosen in this way coincides (for every possible history) with
the one that would be chosen under an optimal plan, as asserted by the proposition.
Proposition 3. Randomization of monetary policy reduces the expected losses
(2.14) — and hence is locally welfare-reducing in the exact problem as well — if and
only if the quadratic form (3.5) is positive definite on the subspace H1. Furthermore,
if and only if this is true, processes {pit, Yˆt} that satisfy the first-order conditions for
the LQ optimization problem represent a loss minimum, and hence an approximation
to (at least a local) welfare maximum in the exact problem.
Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient conditions for (3.5) to be positive defi-
nite on H1 reduce to the following: qpi and qy are not both equal to zero; and either
(i) qy ≥ 0 and
qpi + (1− β1/2)2κ−2qy > 0, (A.1)
holds, or (ii) qy ≤ 0 and
qpi + (1 + β
1/2)2κ−2qy > 0, (A.2)
holds.
Proof: (1) We begin by considering the second-order conditions for optimality,
i.e., the conditions under which a solution to the first-order conditions (3.9)–(3.10)
will represent a loss minimum. Let {pit, Yˆt} be any stochastic processes in H con-
sistent with both the equilibrium relation (2.16) at all dates t ≥ t0 and the initial
constraint (2.15), and then consider the perturbed processes {p˜it, Y˜t} defined by (3.1)
for some stochastic processes {ψpit , ψyt } ∈ H1. Because the perturbation processes
are assumed to satisfy (3.3) and (3.4), both the original processes (pi, Yˆ ) and the
perturbed processes (p˜i, Y˜ ) represent rational-expectations equilibria consistent with
(2.15). It also follows from our hypotheses that both pairs of stochastic processes
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belong to H, and hence that the loss function (2.14) is well-defined for each pair of
processes.
Let L(pi, Yˆ ) denote the value of (2.14) in the case of the original processes and
L(p˜i, Y˜ ) the value in the case of the perturbed processes. Then
L(p˜i, Y˜ ) = L(pi, Yˆ ) + Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [qpipitψ
pi
t + qyYˆtψ
y
t ] + Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[qpi
2
ψpi
2
t +
qy
2
ψy2t
]
.
(A.3)
Suppose furthermore that the original processes {pit, Yˆt} satisfy the first-order con-
ditions for a loss minimum (3.9)–(3.10). This implies that the middle term on the
right-hand side of (A.3) must equal zero, for any processes {ψpit , ψyt } satisfying (3.2)
– (3.4). A solution to the first-order conditions is then a loss minimum if and only if
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[qpi
2
ψpi2t +
qy
2
ψy2t
]
> 0 (A.4)
for any processes {ψpit , ψyt } satisfying (3.2) – (3.4), other than the trivial case in which
ψpit = ψ
y
t = 0 for all t almost surely. Thus the first- and second-order conditions are
jointly necessary and sufficient for a pair of processes (pi, Yˆ ) ∈ H to represent a loss
minimum in the LQ problem; they also imply that the solution {pit, Yˆt} approximates
an equilibrium that maximizes expected utility at least locally in the exact policy
problem.
(2) The second-order conditions (A.4) are also necessary and sufficient in order
for arbitrary randomization of policy to be welfare-reducing, at least locally. For
suppose that {p˜it, Y˜t} are some equilibrium processes consistent with (2.15), (2.16) and
(3.2), which depend non-trivially on the realization of a “sunspot” variable at some
date t > t0. Then let {pit, Yˆt} be the processes obtained by averaging the processes
{p˜it, Y˜t} over the alternative sunspot states with the same values of all “fundamental”
disturbances. The processes {pit, Yˆt} will then also satisfy (2.16) for all t ≥ t0, (2.15)
and (3.2). Defining the processes {ψpit , ψyt } by relations (3.1), one notes that
Et0pitψ
pi
t = Et0Yˆtψ
y
t = 0
for all t > t0. Hence the middle term on the right-hand side of (A.3) is equal to zero.
Then if the second-order conditions (A.4) hold, it follows that L(pi, Yˆ ) < L(p˜i, Y˜ ).
Since a lower-loss equilibrium can be found in the case of any equilibrium {p˜it, Y˜t} that
involves arbitrary randomization, optimal policy cannot involve such randomization.
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(3) Conversely, suppose that the second-order conditions do not hold. Then there
exist processes {ψpit , ψyt }, not both equal to zero almost surely at all times, such that
the expression in (A.4) is less than or equal to zero. Since condition (A.4) depends
only on the serial correlation properties of the processes {ψpit , ψyt }, and not on their
relation to any fundamental sources of uncertainty, we may suppose that they are
“sunspot” variables, distributed independently of the fundamental disturbances. We
may furthermore suppose that they have ex ante mean zero, i.e., that
Et0ψ
pi
t = Et0ψ
y
t = 0 (A.5)
for all t ≥ t0.42
Now consider any equilibrium processes {pit, Yˆt} consistent with (2.15) and (3.2),
and the perturbed processes {p˜it, Y˜t} defined by (3.1), where {ψpit , ψyt } are the sunspot
processes just discussed. The perturbed processes represent another possible equilib-
rium consistent with (2.15) and (3.2), one involving arbitrary randomization. Further-
more, because the processes {ψpit , ψyt } are distributed independently of the processes
{pit, Yˆt},
Et0pitψ
pi
t = Et0pitEt0ψ
pi
t = 0,
and likewise for Et0Yˆtψ
y
t . It follows that the middle term on the right-hand side of
(A.3) must equal zero. Then the hypothesis that (A.4) does not hold implies that
L(p˜i, Y˜ ) ≤ L(pi, Yˆ ), so that arbitrary randomization is not welfare-reducing. Thus
the second-order condition is also necessary for this not to be possible.
(4) It remains to consider the algebraic conditions on the parameters of the LQ
optimization problem under which (A.4) holds for all stochastic processes ψ ∈ H1
that are not equal to zero at all times almost surely. We first show that this is
42Let {ψˆpit , ψˆ
y
t } be any sunspot processes (not almost surely equal to zero at all times) that satisfy
(3.3) for all t ≥ t0 and (3.4), as well as (3.2), such that the expression in (A.4) is less than or equal
to zero. By hypothesis, some such processes exist. Then consider the alternative sunspot processes
such that ψ˜
pi
t0 = ψ˜
y
t0 = 0, while the joint distribution of the processes {ψ˜
pi
t , ψ˜
y
t } for t ≥ t0 + 1 is
identical to the joint distribution of the processes {ψˆpit , ψˆ
y
t } for t ≥ t0, under a time shift of one
period. Finally, let ψpit0 = ψ
y
t0 = 0, and ψ
pi
t = σt0+1ψ˜
pi
t , ψ
y
t = σt0+1ψ˜
y
t for all t ≥ t0 + 1, where σt0+1
is another independently distributed sunspot variable, realized at date t0+1, and taking the value -1
or 1, each with probability 1/2. Then the processes {ψpit , ψyt } are also sunspot processes, not almost
surely equal to zero at all times, that satisfy (3.3) for all t ≥ t0 and (3.4), as well as (3.2), and such
that the expression in (A.4) is less than or equal to zero. In addition, the new processes {ψpit , ψyt }
necessarily satisfy (A.5), even if the original processes {ψˆpit , ψˆ
y
t } did not.
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equivalent to the positive definiteness of a corresponding quadratic form defined for
deterministic sequences. Let H¯ be the Hilbert space of complex-valued sequences
{ψ¯pit , ψ¯yt } such that ∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0|xt|2 <∞ (A.6)
for x = ψ¯
pi
, ψ¯
y
, and let H¯1 be the subspace of H¯ consisting of sequences that in
addition satisfy
ψ¯
pi
t = κψ¯
y
t + βψ¯
pi
t+1 (A.7)
for all t ≥ t0.43 Then we shall establish that (A.4) holds for all (real-valued) stochastic
processes {ψpit , ψyt } ∈ H1 that are not equal to zero at all times almost surely if and
only if
L¯(ψ¯) ≡
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[qpi
2
|ψ¯pit |2 +
qy
2
|ψ¯yt |2
]
> 0 (A.8)
for any complex-valued (deterministic) sequences {ψ¯pit , ψ¯yt } ∈ H¯1 that are not equal
to zero at all times.
We begin by showing that (A.4) holding on H1 implies that (A.8) must hold on
H¯1. We show this by contradiction. Suppose instead that that there exists a pair of
sequences {ψ¯pit , ψ¯yt } ∈ H¯1, not both equal to zero at all dates, for which (A.8) does
not hold. If a pair of complex-valued sequences of this kind exist, we can also find a
pair of real-valued sequences. For any ψ¯ ∈ H¯1 can be written as
ψ¯ = ψ¯
re
+ iψ¯
im
,
where ψ¯
re
, ψ¯
im
are real-valued sequences, and it can be shown that ψ¯
re
, ψ¯
im
are both
real-valued elements of H¯1. Furthermore, one observes that
L¯(ψ¯) = L¯(ψ¯
re
) + L¯(ψ¯
im
).
Then as by hypothesis L¯(ψ¯) ≤ 0, it follows that L¯ ≤ 0 for at least one of the real-
valued sequences as well. Thus we may assume without loss of generality that ψ¯ is a
real-valued sequence.
Then we can define a real-valued sunspot process ψpit0 = ψ
y
t0 = 0, and ψ
pi
t =
σt0+1ψ¯
pi
t−1, ψ
y
t = σt0+1ψ¯
y
t−1 for all t ≥ t0+1, where σt0+1 is an independently distributed
43Note that in the definition of the subspace H¯1, we do not require that a condition analogous to
(2.15) be satisfied.
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sunspot variable, realized at date t0 + 1, and taking the value -1 or 1, each with
probability 1/2. Then the processes {ψpit , ψyt } satisfy (3.2), are not almost surely
equal to zero at all times, satisfy (3.3) for all t ≥ t0, and satisfy (3.4), but are such
that the left-hand side of (A.4) is less than or equal to zero. Thus (A.4) would not
hold for all processes ψ ∈ H1. It follows that if (A.4) holds on H1, (A.8) must hold
for all complex-valued sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯1.
(5) Conversely, one can also show that (A.8) holding on H¯1 implies that (A.4)
must hold on H1. Let any process ψ ∈ H1 be decomposed as
ψt =
t−t0∑
j=0
ψ
(j)
t ,
where ψ
(0)
t ≡ Et0ψt and ψ(j)t ≡ Et0+jψt − Et0+j−1ψt, for each j ≥ 1. Note that this
implies that ψ
(j)
t = 0 for all t0 ≤ t < t0 + j, and that the entire sequence {ψ(j)t } is
known with certainty at date t0 + j. It then follows that
Et0x
2
t =
t−t0∑
j=0
Et0x
(j)2
t (A.9)
for x = ψpi, ψy, from which it follows that if the process {xt} satisfies (3.2), the process
{x(j)t } must also satisfy (3.2), for each j ≥ 0. This in turn implies that for any j, the
sequences of values {ψ(j)t } for t ≥ t0 + j satisfies (A.6) almost surely. Furthermore,
if for any j ≥ 0 we define the sequence ψ¯(j) by ψ¯(j)t = ψ(j)t+j for all t ≥ t0, then the
fact that (by hypothesis) the process ψ satisfies (3.3) furthermore implies that the
sequences ψ¯
(j)
each such satisfy (A.7) almost surely.44 Thus for each j ≥ 0, the
sequence ψ¯
(j)
belongs almost surely to H¯1. Furthermore, there exists at least one j
for which ψ¯
(j)
is not almost surely equal to zero.
It follows from (A.9) that
L(ψpi, ψy) =
∞∑
j=0
βjEt0L¯(ψ¯
(j)
). (A.10)
Since by hypothesis (A.8) holds for all elements of H¯1, L(ψ¯(j)) ≥ 0 for all j, and
the inequality is strict in the case of those j (of which there must be at least one,
44The value of the sequence ψ¯(j) is known with certainty at date t0+ j. The “almost surely” refers
to the ex ante probability distribution over possible states of the world at date t0 + j.
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with positive probability) for which ψ(j) 6= 0. Thus the sum on the right-hand side
of (A.10) must be positive, from which it follows that ψ satisfies (A.4), as was to be
proven.
(6) Our problem thus reduces to a search for necessary and sufficient conditions
under which (A.8) must be satisfied by all complex-valued sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯1.We can
show that this is equivalent to a related problem that arises in connection with the
optimal control of a purely backward-looking system, so that classical results can be
applied. Let H¯2 be the subspace of H¯1 consisting of those sequences that satisfy the
additional condition ψpit0 = 0. We shall establish that (A.8) holds for all sequences
ψ ∈ H¯1 if and only if it holds for all sequences in H¯2. It is obvious, of course, that if
(A.8) holds on H¯1 it must hold on H¯2. It remains to show that the converse is true
as well.
For any complex number ψ0, let us define
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V (ψ0) ≡ min
ψ¯∈H¯1
L¯(ψ¯) s.t. ψ¯
pi
t0
= ψ0.
We establish the following properties of the function V . First, we note that if ψ¯ is
an element of H¯1 consistent with initial condition ψ0, then the complex conjugate
sequence ψ¯
†
is an element of H¯1 consistent with initial condition ψ†0. Then since
L¯(ψ¯
†
) = L¯(ψ¯), it follows that V (ψ†0) ≤ V (ψ0). The same argument can be used to
show that V (ψ0) ≤ V (ψ†0), and so we conclude that V (ψ†0) = V (ψ0) for all ψ0. An
argument of exactly the same form shows that V (−ψ0) = V (ψ0) for all ψ0.
Similarly, if ψ¯1 is an element of H¯1 consistent with initial condition ψ0,1, and ψ¯2
is an element of H¯1 consistent with ψ0,2, then for any real number 0 < λ < 1, one
observes that the sequence λψ¯1+(1−λ)ψ¯2 is an element of H¯1 consistent with initial
condition λψ0,1 + (1− λ)ψ0,2. Because L¯ is a convex function,
L¯(λψ¯1 + (1− λ)ψ¯2) ≤ λL¯(ψ¯1) + (1− λ)L¯(ψ¯2), (A.11)
from which it follows that
V (λψ0,1 + (1− λ)ψ0,2) ≤ λV (ψ0,1) + (1− λ)V (ψ0,2). (A.12)
45It is easily shown that the set of sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯1 consistent with any given initial value ψ0 is
non-empty. If there is no lower bound on the value of L¯ on this set, the value of V (ψ0) is defined to
be −∞.
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One thus establishes that V is a convex function of ψ0. Furthermore, the inequality
in (A.11) is strict unless ψ¯1 = ψ¯2, from which it follows that the inequality in (A.12)
is strict unless ψ0,1 = ψ0,2 or V (ψ1,0) = V (ψ2,0) = −∞. Thus V is a strictly convex
function, if there exists any ψ0 for which V (ψ0) > −∞.
We have established that if there exists any ψ0 for which V (ψ0) > −∞, V is a
strictly convex function of ψ0 with the properties that V (ψ
†
0) = V (ψ0) and V (−ψ0) =
V (ψ0) for all ψ0. It is easily shown that any such function must reach its unique
minimum at ψ0 = 0. Hence V (ψ0) > 0 for all ψ0 6= 0 if and only if V (ψ0) ≥ 0. It then
follows that L¯(ψ¯) > 0 for all non-zero ψ¯ ∈ H¯1 if and only if the same inequality holds
for all non-zero ψ¯ ∈ H¯1 that satisfy the initial condition ψ¯pit0 = 0, i.e., all non-zero
ψ¯ ∈ H¯2. This is what we have sought to establish.
(7) Our problem now reduces to a search for necessary and sufficient conditions
under which (A.8) must be satisfied by all complex-valued sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯2. This is
just the second-order condition for optimality in the problem of minimizing
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{qpi
2
pi2t +
qy
2
y2t
}
, (A.13)
subject to the constraints that the deterministic sequences {pit, yt} satisfy (3.2) and
the law of motion
pit+1 = β
−1[pit − κyt], (A.14)
starting from a given initial condition for the predetermined state variable pit0 . (Note
that (A.14) is just a deterministic version of (2.16), except that we now treat inflation
as a predetermined state variable, so that the constraint (A.14) is no longer forward-
looking.)
This problem is of the type studied by Telser and Graves (1972). We can write
our problem as the minimization of a loss function of the form
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0x′tBxt
where
xt ≡
[
pit
yt
]
, B ≡
[
qpi 0
0 qy
]
,
subject to a law of motion of the form
A(L)xt = 0
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for all t ≥ t0, where
A(L) ≡ [1 0] + [−β−1 β−1κ]L.
Then by Theorems 5.1 and 5.3 of Telser and Graves, the second-order condition for
this problem is satisfied — i.e., (A.8) is satisfied by all complex-valued sequences
ψ¯ ∈ H¯2 — if and only if the determinant of the bordered Hermitian matrix46
M(θ) ≡
[
0 A(β1/2e−iθ)
A′(β1/2eiθ) B
]
is negative for all −pi ≤ θ ≤ pi.
In our case,
detM(θ) = −qpiβ−1κ2 − qy(1− 2β−1/2 cos θ + β−1),
so that the SOC reduces to the requirement that
min
θ
{
qpiβ
−1κ2 + qy(1− 2β−1/2 cos θ + β−1)
}
> 0. (A.15)
If qy ≥ 0, the minimum value of the term in curly braces occurs when θ = 0, in
which case the term in parentheses is equal to (1 − β−1/2)2. If instead qy ≤ 0, the
minimum value occurs when θ = ±pi, in which case the term in parentheses is equal
to (1−β−1/2)2. Making the appropriate substitution in each of the two cases, we find
that (A.15) is equivalent to the inequalities stated in the proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Yˆ nt = Yˆ
∗
t at all times, and that the conditions
stated in Proposition 3 are satisfied. Then the policy that uniquely minimizes Lt0 is
the one under which pit = 0 at all times, regardless of the realizations of the exogenous
disturbances [as long as these are small enough to make such an equilibrium possible].
Proof. If Yˆ nt = Yˆ
∗
t at all times, then ut = 0 at all times. The first-order necessary
conditions for an optimum47 are then
qpipit + ϕt − ϕt−1 = 0,
46In the way that Telser and Graves define the matrix M(θ), 2B appears as the lower right block
rather than B, but this makes no difference for the second-order conditions that are implied. Note
that replacing B by B/2 in the loss function does not change the optimization problem at all.
47See section 3.3 for further discussion of these.
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qyyt − κϕt = 0,
together with
pit − κyt − βEtpit+1 = 0,
each of which must hold for all t ≥ t0. If there is an additional constraint of the
form (2.15), then this condition also be satisfied by an optimum; if there is no such
constraint, then one must adjoin the additional condition
ϕt0−1 = 0.
In the case that disturbances are small enough, a policy under which pit = 0 at all
times is feasible, since the nominal interest rate required for this equilibrium is non-
negative at all times. Moreover this policy satisfies the above necessary conditions
for an optimum, as all of these conditions are observed to be satisfied in the case that
pit = yt = ϕt = 0 for all t. Proposition 3 implies that the second-order conditions are
also satisfied, and that the zero-inflation policy represents a unique loss minimum for
all t ≥ t0, among those policies consistent with an initial commitment p¯it0 = 0.
The Kuhn-Tucker theorem then implies that the zero-inflation policy also mini-
mizes
Lt0 − ϕt0−1pit0 ,
for some value of the multiplier ϕt0−1, subject only to the constraint that the paths
{pit, yt} represent a rational-expectations equilibrium. The first-order conditions for
this alternative minimization problem are easily seen to be identical to the conditions
written above, from which we observe that the value of the multiplier is zero. Hence
the zero-inflation policy minimizes Lt0 , even when the value of pit0 is unconstrained.
Proposition 5 is proved in the text, and Proposition 6 is directly analogous to the
results derived in Woodford (2003, chap. 7).
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B Additional Appendices
B.1 The deterministic steady state
Here we show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of a solution to the recursive policy
problem defined in Proposition 2 (under appropriate initial conditions) that involves
constant values of all variables. We consider a deterministic problem in which the
exogenous disturbances C¯t, Gt, H¯t, At, µ
w
t , τ t each take constant values C¯, H¯, A¯, µ¯
w,
τ¯ > 0 and G¯ ≥ 0 for all t ≥ t0. We wish to find an initial degree of price dispersion
∆t0−1 and initial commitments Xt0 = X¯ such that the recursive problem involves a
constant policy xt0 = x¯, Xt+1 = X¯ each period, in which ∆¯ is equal to the initial
price dispersion.
We thus consider the problem of maximizing
Ut0 =
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(Yt,∆t) (B.16)
subject to the constraints
Ktp(Πt)
1+ωθ
θ−1 = Ft, (B.17)
Ft = (1− τ t)f(Yt) + αβΠθ−1t+1Ft+1, (B.18)
Kt = k(Yt) + αβΠ
θ(1+ω)
t+1 Kt+1, (B.19)
∆t = α∆t−1Π
θ(1+ω)
t + (1− α)p(Πt)−
θ(1+ω)
1−θ , (B.20)
and given the specified initial conditions ∆t0−1, Xt0 , where we have defined
p(Πt) ≡
(
1− αΠθ−1t
1− α
)
.
We introduce Lagrange multipliers φ1t through φ4t corresponding to constraints
(B.17) through (B.20) respectively. We also introduce multipliers dated t0 corre-
sponding to the constraints implied by the initial conditions Xt0 = X¯; the latter
multipliers are normalized in such a way that the first-order conditions take the same
form at date t0 as at all later dates. The first-order conditions of the maximization
problem are then the following. The one with respect to Yt is
Uy(Yt,∆t)− (1− τ t)fy(Yt)φ2t − ky(Yt)φ3t = 0; (B.21)
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that with respect to ∆t is
U∆(Yt,∆t) + φ4t − αβΠθ(1+ω)t+1 φ4,t+1 = 0; (B.22)
that with respect to Πtis
1 + ωθ
θ − 1 p(Πt)
(1+ωθ)
θ−1 −1ppi(Πt)Ktφ1,t − α(θ − 1)Πθ−2t Ftφ2,t−1
−θ(1 + ω)αΠθ(1+ω)−1t Ktφ3,t−1+
−θ(1 + ω)α∆t−1Πθ(1+ω)−1t φ4t −
θ(1 + ω)
θ − 1 (1− α)p(Πt)
(1+ωθ)
θ−1 ppi(Πt)φ4t = 0; (B.23)
that with respect to Ft is
−φ1t + φ2t − αΠθ−1t φ2,t−1 = 0; (B.24)
that with respect to Kt is
p(Πt)
1+ωθ
θ−1 φ1t + φ3t − αΠθ(1+ω)t φ3,t−1 = 0; (B.25)
We search for a solution to these first-order conditions in which Πt = Π¯, ∆t = ∆¯,
Yt = Y¯ at all times. A steady-state solution of this kind also requires that the
Lagrange multipliers take constant values. We furthermore conjecture the existence
of a solution in which Π¯ = 1, as stated in the text. Note that such a solution
implies that ∆¯ = 1, p(Π¯) = 1, ppi(Π¯) = −(θ − 1)α/(1 − α), and K¯ = F¯ . Using
these substitutions, we find that (the steady-state version of) each of the first-order
conditions (B.21) – (B.25) is satisfied if the steady-state values satisfy
[(1− τ¯)fy(Y¯ )− ky(Y¯ )]φ2 = Uy(Y¯ , 1),
(1− αβ)φ4 = −U∆(Y¯ , 1),
φ1 = (1− α)φ2,
φ3 = −φ2.
These equations can obviously be solved (uniquely) for the steady-state multipliers,
given any value Y¯ > 0.
Similarly, (the steady-state versions of) the constraints (B.17) – (B.20) are satis-
fied if
(1− τ¯)uc(Y¯ − G¯) = θ
θ − 1 µ¯
wvy(Y¯ ), (B.26)
K¯ = F¯ = (1− αβ)−1k(Y¯ ),
Equation (B.26) can be solved for the steady-state value Y¯ .
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B.2 A second-order approximation to utility (equations (2.1),
(2.2) and (2.3))
We derive here equations (2.1) — (2.3) in the main text, taking a second-order ap-
proximation to (equation (1.8)) following the treatment in Woodford (2003, chapter
6). We start by approximating the expected discounted value of the utility of the
representative household
Ut0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
u(Yt; ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v(yt(i); ξt)di
]
. (B.27)
First we note that∫ 1
0
v(yt(i); ξt)di =
λ
1 + ν
Y 1+ωt
A1+ωt H¯
ν
t
∆t = v(Yt; ξt)∆t
where ∆t is the measure of price dispersion defined in the text. We can then write
(B.27) as
Ut0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u(Yt; ξt)− v(Yt; ξt)∆t] . (B.28)
The first term in (B.28) can be approximated using a second-order Taylor expan-
sion around the steady state defined in the previous section as
u(Yt; ξt) = u¯+ u¯cY˜t + u¯ξξt +
1
2
u¯ccY˜
2
t + u¯cξξtY˜t +
1
2
ξ′tu¯ξξξt +O(||ξ||3)
= u¯+ Y¯ u¯c · (Yˆt + 1
2
Yˆ 2t ) + u¯ξξt +
1
2
Y¯ u¯ccYˆ
2
t
+Y¯ u¯cξξtYˆt +
1
2
ξ′tu¯ξξξt +O(||ξ||3)
= Y¯ ucYˆt +
1
2
[Y¯ u¯c + Y¯
2u¯cc]Yˆ
2
t − Y¯ 2u¯ccgtYˆt + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
= Y¯ u¯c
{
Yˆt +
1
2
(1− σ−1)Yˆ 2t + σ−1gtYˆt
}
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (B.29)
where a bar denotes the steady-state value for each variable, a tilde denotes the
deviation of the variable from its steady-state value (e.g., Y˜t ≡ Yt−Y¯ ), and a hat refers
to the log deviation of the variable from its steady-state value (e.g., Yˆt ≡ lnYt/Y¯ ).
We use ξt to refer to the entire vector of exogenous shocks,
ξ′t ≡
[
Gˆ gt qt µˆ
w
t τˆ t
]
,
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in which Gˆt ≡ (Gt − G¯)/Y , gt ≡ Gˆt + sC c¯t, ωqt ≡ νh¯t + φ(1 + ν)at, µˆwt ≡ lnµwt /µ¯w,
τˆ t ≡ (τ t − τ¯)/τ¯ , c¯t ≡ ln C¯t/C¯, at ≡ lnAt/A¯, h¯t ≡ ln H¯t/H¯. Moreover, we use the
definitions σ−1 ≡ σ˜−1s−1C with sC ≡ C¯/Y¯ . We have used the Taylor expansion
Yt/Y¯ = 1 + Yˆt +
1
2
Yˆ 2t +O(||ξ||3)
to get a relation for Y˜t in terms of Yˆt. Finally the term “t.i.p.” denotes terms that
are independent of policy, and may accordingly be suppressed as far as the welfare
ranking of alternative policies is concerned.
We may similarly approximate v(Yt; ξt)∆t by
v(Yt; ξt)∆t = v¯ + v¯(∆t − 1) + v¯y(Yt − Y¯ ) + v¯y(∆t − 1)(Yt − Y¯ ) + (∆t − 1)v¯ξξt
+
1
2
v¯yy(Yt − Y¯ )2 + (Yt − Y¯ )v¯yξξt +
1
2
ξ′tv¯ξξξt+O(||ξ||3)
= v¯(∆t − 1) + v¯yY¯
(
Yˆt +
1
2
Yˆ 2t
)
+ v¯y(∆t − 1)Y¯ Yˆt + (∆t − 1)v¯ξξt
+
1
2
v¯yyY¯
2Yˆ 2t + Y¯ Yˆtv¯yξξt + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (B.30)
= v¯yY¯ [
∆t − 1
1 + ω
+ Yˆt +
1
2
(1 + ω)Yˆ 2t + (∆t − 1)Yˆt − ωYˆtqt
−∆t − 1
1 + ω
ωqt] + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (B.31)
We further note that a Taylor approximation to (1.20), of first order in ∆ˆt and of
second order in pit, takes the form
∆ˆt = α∆ˆt−1 +
α
1− αθ(1 + ω)(1 + ωθ)
pi2t
2
+O(||ξ||3), (B.32)
which involves no linear terms in inflation. It follows that as long as ∆ˆt0−1 =
O(||ξ||2),48 (B.32) implies that ∆ˆt = O(||ξ||2) for all t ≥ t0. Then since
∆t = 1 + ∆ˆt +O(|∆ˆt|2),
it follows that ∆t − 1 = O(||ξ||2) for all t ≥ t0 as well.
48Note that equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) in the text are correct only under this assumption. It
should be recalled that in footnote 47 of the text, we have defined the bound ||ξ|| so as to ensure
that this is true.
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Substituting this into (B.31) yields
v(Yt; ξt)∆t = (1− Φ)Y¯ uc
{
∆ˆt
1 + ω
+ Yˆt +
1
2
(1 + ω)Yˆ 2t − ωYˆtqt
}
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
(B.33)
where we have used the steady state relation v¯y = (1−Φ)u¯cto replace v¯y by (1−Φ)u¯c,
and where
Φ ≡ 1−
(
θ − 1
θ
)(
1− τ¯
µ¯w
)
< 1
measures the inefficiency of steady-state output Y¯ . Combining (B.29) and (B.33), we
then obtain equation (2.1) in the text,
Ut0 = Y¯ u¯c · Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ΦYˆt − 1
2
uyyYˆ
2
t + Yˆtuyξξt − u∆∆ˆt
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3), (B.34)
where
uyy ≡ (ω + σ−1)− Φ(1 + ω),
uyξξt ≡ [σ−1gt + (1− Φ)ωqt],
u∆ ≡ (1− Φ)
1 + ω
.
We finally observe that (B.32) can be integrated to obtain
∆ˆt = α
t−t0+1∆ˆt0−1+
α
(1− α)(1− αβ)θ(1+ω)(1+ωθ)
t∑
s=t0
αt−s
pi2s
2
+O(||ξ||3). (B.35)
Multiplying this by βt−t0 and summing over t, we obtain expression (2.2) in the text,
where “t.i.p.” refers to a multiple of ∆ˆt0−1. By substituting this expression for the
term
∑∞
t=t0
βt−t0 ∆ˆt in (B.34), we obtain equation (2.3) in the text, in which we
further define
κ ≡ (1− αβ)(1− α)
α
(ω + σ−1)
(1 + θω)
, upi ≡ θ(ω + σ
−1)(1− Φ)
κ
. (B.36)
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B.3 A second-order approximation to the AS equation (equa-
tions (2.4), (2.7), and (2.8))
The AS relation can be written exactly as
log
(
1− αΠ
θ−1
t
1− α
)
=
θ − 1
1 + ωθ
(logKt − logFt). (B.37)
A second-order Taylor series for the left-hand side of (B.37) takes the form
log
(
1− αΠ
θ−1
t
1− α
)
=
α
1− α(θ − 1)
{
pit +
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t +O(||ξ||3).
}
(B.38)
It remains to derive similar second-order approximations for logKt and logFt on the
right-hand side.
The definitions of Kt and Ft imply second-order expansions
Kˆt +
1
2
Kˆ2t +O(||ξ||3) = (1− αβ)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆt,T +
1
2
kˆ2t,T
]
+O(||ξ||3) (B.39)
Fˆt +
1
2
Fˆ 2t +O(||ξ||3) = (1− αβ)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
fˆt,T +
1
2
fˆ 2t,T
]
+O(||ξ||3) (B.40)
where kˆt,T and fˆt,T are given by
kˆt,T ≡ kˆT + θ(1 + ω)
T∑
s=t+1
pis
fˆt,T ≡ fˆT + (θ − 1)
T∑
s=t+1
pis
and we use the definitions
kˆT ≡ (1 + ω)YˆT − ωqT + µˆwT (B.41)
fˆT ≡ SˆT + YˆT − σ˜−1(CˆT − c¯T ) (B.42)
SˆT ≡ log(1− τ t)/(1− τ¯).
Substituting (B.38) into (B.37) yields
pit +
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t =
1− α
α
1
1 + ωθ
(Kˆt − Fˆt) +O(||ξ||3). (B.43)
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Note that to first order, this reduces to
pit =
1− α
α
1
1 + ωθ
(Kˆt − Fˆt) +O(||ξ||2) (B.44)
=
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α
1
1 + ωθ
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆt,T − fˆt,T
]
+O(||ξ||2). (B.45)
We can use (B.39)–(B.40) to obtain a second-order expansion for the right-hand
side of (B.43). Subtracting (B.40) from (B.39), we obtain
Kˆt − Fˆt = (1− αβ)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(kˆt,T − fˆt,T ) + 1
2
(kˆ2t,T − fˆ 2t,T )
]
−1
2
(Kˆ2t − Fˆ 2t ) +O(||ξ||3)
= (1− αβ)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(kˆt,T − fˆt,T ) + 1
2
(kˆ2t,T − fˆ 2t,T )
]
(B.46)
−1
2
(Kˆt − Fˆt)(Kˆt + Fˆt) +O(||ξ||3)
= (1− αβ)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(kˆt,T − fˆt,T ) + 1
2
(kˆ2t,T − fˆ 2t,T )
]
(B.47)
−1
2
(1− αβ) α
(1− α)(1 + ωθ)pitZt +O(||ξ||
3),
where in passing from (B.46) to (B.47) we have used (B.44) to substitute for (Kˆt−Fˆt)
in the second term on the right-hand side, and
(Kˆt + Fˆt) = (1− αβ)Zt +O(||ξ||2)
to substitute for (Kˆt + Fˆt), in which expression we define
Zt ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆt,T + fˆt,T
]
. (B.48)
We can use the definitions of kˆt,T and fˆt,T to further expand the first term on the
right-hand side of (B.47). We obtain
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆt,T − fˆt,T
]
= Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆT − fˆT
]
+ (1 + ωθ)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
T∑
s=t+1
pis
= Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆT − fˆT
]
+
(1 + ωθ)
1− αβ Pt, (B.49)
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where
Pt ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t+1
(αβ)T−tpiT , (B.50)
and
1
2
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆ2t,T − fˆ 2t,T
]
=
1
2
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆ2T − fˆ 2T
]
+Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t[θ(1 + ω)kˆT + (1− θ)fˆT ] ·
T∑
s=t+1
pis
+
1
2
(2θ + θω − 1)(1 + θω)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
(
T∑
s=t+1
pis
)2
=
1
2
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
kˆ2T − fˆ 2T
]
+ Et
∞∑
T=t+1
(αβ)T−tpiTNT
+
1
2
(2θ + θω − 1)(1 + θω)
(1− αβ) Et
∞∑
T=t+1
(αβ)T−tpiT (piT + 2PT )
where
Nt ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t[θ(1 + ω)kˆT + (1− θ)fˆT ]. (B.51)
Substituting these expressions into (B.47), we obtain
Kˆt − Fˆt = (1− αβ)Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
(kˆT − fˆT ) + 1
2
(kˆ2T − fˆ 2T )
]
+
+(1 + ωθ)Et
∞∑
T=t+1
(αβ)T−tpiT + (1− αβ)Et
∞∑
T=t+1
(αβ)T−tpiTNT +
1
2
(2θ + θω − 1)(1 + θω)Et
∞∑
T=t+1
(αβ)T−tpiT (piT + 2PT )
−1
2
(1− αβ) α
(1− α)(1 + ωθ)pitZt +O(||ξ||
3). (B.52)
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This can be written recursively as
Kˆt − Fˆt + 1
2
α(1− αβ)(1 + ωθ)
(1− α) pitZt = (1− αβ)
[
(kˆt − fˆt) + 1
2
(kˆ2t − fˆ 2t )
]
+
+αβ(1 + ωθ)Etpit+1 + (1− αβ)αβEtpit+1Nt+1 +
1
2
(2θ + θω − 1)(1 + θω)Etpit+1(pit+1 + 2Pt+1) +
+αβEt
[
Kˆt+1 − Fˆt+1 + 1
2
α(1− αβ)(1 + ωθ)
(1− α) pit+1Zt+1
]
+
+O(||ξ||3) (B.53)
Using (B.43) to substitute for Kˆt − Fˆt in (B.53), we obtain
pit +
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t +
1
2
(1− αβ)pitZt = 1− α
α
(1− αβ)
(1 + ωθ)
[
(kˆt − fˆt) + 1
2
(kˆ2t − fˆ 2t )
]
+
+(1− α)βEtpit+1 + (1− α)β (1− αβ)
(1 + θω)
Etpit+1Nt+1 +
1
2
(2θ + θω − 1)(1− α)βEtpit+1(pit+1 + 2Pt+1) +
+αβEt
[
pit+1 +
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t+1 +
1
2
(1− αβ)pit+1Zt+1
]
+
+O(||ξ||3). (B.54)
This is our second-order approximation to the AS relation. Note that to first order,
this reduces to
pit =
1− α
α
(1− αβ)
(1 + ωθ)
(kˆt − fˆt) + βEtpit+1 +O(||ξ||2), (B.55)
as could also have been obtained directly from (B.45).
We can furthermore eliminate Nt by observing that (B.51) implies that
Nt ≡ 1
2
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t[(1 + θω)(kˆt + fˆt) + (2θ + θω − 1)(kˆt − fˆt)]
=
1
2
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t[(1 + θω)(kˆt,T + fˆt,T ) + (2θ + θω − 1)(kˆt,T − fˆt,T )]
−(2θ + θω − 1)(1 + θω)
(1− αβ) Pt
=
1
2
(1 + θω)Zt +
1
2
(2θ + θω − 1)(1 + θω)
1− α
α
(1− αβ)pit
−(2θ + θω − 1)(1 + θω)
(1− αβ) Pt (B.56)
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By substituting (B.56) into (B.54), we obtain
pit +
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t +
1
2
(1− αβ)pitZt = 1− α
α
(1− αβ)
(1 + ωθ)
[
(kˆt − fˆt) + 1
2
(kˆ2t − fˆ 2t )
]
+
+βEtpit+1 +
1
2
β(1− αβ)Etpit+1Zt+1 +
1
2
(2θ + θω − 1)βEtpi2t+1 + αβEt
[
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t+1
]
+
+O(||ξ||3),
which can be rewritten as
pit +
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t +
1
2
(1− αβ)pitZt = 1− α
α
(1− αβ)
(1 + ωθ)
[
(kˆt − fˆt) + 1
2
(kˆ2t − fˆ 2t )
]
+βEtpit+1 +
1
2
β(1− αβ)Etpit+1Zt+1 + βEt
[
1
2
θ − 1
1− αpi
2
t+1
]
+
1
2
θ(1 + ω)βEtpi
2
t+1 +O(||ξ||3). (B.57)
This is a relation of the form (2.4); it can be integrated forward to obtain a relation
of the form (2.8),
Vt0 =
1− α
α
(1− αβ)
(1 + ωθ)
Et
∞∑
t=t0
(αβ)t−t0
[
(kˆt − fˆt) + 1
2
(kˆ2t − fˆ 2t )
]
+
1
2
θ(1+ω)Et
∞∑
t=t0
(αβ)t−t0pi2t ,
(B.58)
where
Vt ≡ pit − 1
2
1− θ
1− αpi
2
t +
1
2
(1− αβ)pitZt + 1
2
θ(1 + ω)pi2t . (B.59)
Note that this last definition is of the form (2.5) given in the text, where the coeffi-
cients are defined as
vpi ≡ θ(1 + ω)− 1− θ
(1− α) , vz ≡
(1− αβ)
2
.
We then obtain the relations given in the text by substituting into the above
equations the definitions (B.41) for kˆt and (B.42) for fˆt. In the expression for fˆt, we
can furthermore use a second-order approximation to the identity Yt = Ct + Gt to
solve for Cˆt as a function of Yˆt and exogenous disturbances,
Cˆt = s
−1
C Yˆt − s−1C Gˆt +
s−1C (1− s−1C )
2
Yˆ 2t + s
−2
C YˆtGˆt + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (B.60)
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where “s.o.t.i.p” refers to second-order (or higher) terms independent of policy; the
first-order terms have been kept as these will matter for the log-linear aggregate-
supply relation that appears as a constraint in our policy problem. We similarly note
that
Sˆt = −ωτ τˆ t + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (B.61)
where ωτ ≡ τ¯ /(1 − τ¯). Equations (B.60) – (B.61) can be used to substitute for Cˆt
and Sˆt in (B.42), resulting in an expression for fˆt that involves only Yˆt and elements
of ξt.
Substituting these expressions for kˆt and fˆt into (B.57), we obtain equation (2.4)
in the text, where we define
cξξt ≡ (ω + σ−1)−1[−σ−1gt − ωqt + µˆwt + ωτ τˆ t],
cyy ≡ (2 + ω − σ−1) + σ−1(1− s−1C )(ω + σ−1)−1,
cyξξt ≡ (ω + σ−1)−1[−σ−1s−1C Gˆt + σ−1(1− σ−1)gt + ω(1 + ω)qt
−(1 + ω)µˆwt − (1− σ−1)ωτ τˆ t],
cpi ≡ θ(1 + ω)
κ
,
and κ is again the coefficient defined in (B.36). (Note that κ > 0, as asserted in
the text.) The same substitutions into definition (B.48) allow us to define Zt by an
expression of the form (2.6) given in the text, where
zy ≡ (2 + ω − σ−1) + vk(ω + σ−1),
zξξt ≡ σ−1(1− vk)gt − ω(1 + vk)qt + (1 + vk)µˆwt − ωτ (1− vk)τˆ t,
zpi ≡ −(ω + σ
−1)
κ
vk,
in which expressions we define
vk ≡ κ
(ω + σ−1)
α
1− αβ (1− 2θ − ωθ).
To a first-order approximation, equation (2.4) reduces to equation (2.7) given in
the text. Finally, the same substitutions for kˆt and fˆt into (B.58) yields equation
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(2.8) in the text, where the term cξξt is now included in terms independent of policy.
(Such terms matter when part of the log-linear constraints, as in the case of (2.7),
but not when part of the quadratic objective.)
B.4 Derivation of equation (2.9)
We can multiply equation (2.8) by ΦY¯ u¯c and subtract from (2.1) to obtain
Ut0 = −Y¯ u¯cEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{
1
2
qyYˆ
2
t − Yˆt(uyξξt + Φcyξξt) +
1
2
qpipi
2
t
}
+Tt0+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
where
qpi ≡ upi + Φcpi
=
θ(ω + σ−1)(1− Φ)
κ
+ Φ
θ(1 + ω)
κ
=
θ
κ
[(ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)],
qy ≡ uyy + Φcyy
= (ω + σ−1)− Φ(1 + ω) + Φ(2 + ω − σ−1) + Φσ−1(1− s−1C )(ω + σ−1)−1
= (ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1) + Φσ
−1(1− s−1C )
ω + σ−1
.
This can be rewritten in the form (2.9) given in the text, where
Yˆ ∗t ≡ q−1y [uyξξt + Φcyξξt]
= q−1y {σ−1gt + (1− Φ)ωqt + (ω + σ−1)−1Φ[−σ−1s−1C Gˆt + σ−1(1− σ−1)gt + ω(1 + ω)qt
−(1 + ω)µˆwt − (1− σ−1)ωτ τˆ t]}
= ω1Yˆ
n
t − ω2Gˆt + ω3uˆwt + ω4τˆ t,
and Ω, Yˆ nt , and the ωi are defined as in the text.
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